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CRIMINOLOGY
“DEFUND THE (SCHOOL) POLICE”?
BRINGING DATA TO KEY SCHOOL-TOPRISON PIPELINE CLAIMS
MICHAEL HEISE AND JASON P. NANCE
Nationwide calls to “Defund the Police,” largely attributable to the
resurgent Black Lives Matter demonstrations, have motivated derivative
calls for public school districts to consider “defunding” (or modifying)
school resource officer (“SRO/police”) programs. To be sure, a school’s
SRO/police presence—and the size of that presence—may influence the
school’s student discipline reporting policies and practices. How schools
report student discipline and whether that reporting involves referrals to law
enforcement agencies matters, particularly as reports may fuel a growing
“school-to-prison pipeline.” The school-to-prison pipeline research
literature features two general claims that frame debates about changes in
how public schools approach student discipline and the growing number of
calls for schools to defund SRO/police programs. One claim is that public
schools’ increasingly “legalized” approach toward student discipline
increases the likelihood that students will be thrust into the criminal justice
system. A second distributional claim is that these adverse consequences
disproportionately involve students of color, boys, students from low-income
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. Both claims implicate
important legal and policy dimensions, as students’ adverse interactions with
law enforcement agencies typically impose negative consequences on
students and their futures. We study both claims using the nation’s leading
data set on public school crime and safety, supplemented by data on statelevel mandatory reporting requirements and district-level per pupil


Michael Heise is the William G. McRoberts Professor in the Empirical Study of Law at
Cornell Law School; Jason P. Nance is a Professor at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law. We are grateful to three anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of this Article. Author correspondence: michael.heise@cornell.edu.

717

718

HEISE & NANCE

[Vol. 111

spending, and explore three distinct analytic approaches in an effort to
assess the independent influence of a school’s SRO/police presence on that
school’s student discipline reporting behavior. Results from our analyses
provide mixed support for the two claims. We find that a school’s SRO/police
presence corresponds with an increased likelihood that the school will report
student incidents to law enforcement agencies. However, we do not find
support in the school-level data for the distributional claim.
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INTRODUCTION
While it is not clear at this juncture which lasting legal and policy
changes may emerge from recent and ongoing efforts to “Defund the Police,”
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attributable to the resurgent Black Lives Matters movement,1 one specific
change is already clear: a growing number of public school districts are now
confronting related demands to “defund” school resource officer
(“SRO/police”) programs that operate in one-half of the nation’s public
elementary and secondary schools.2 Despite a sustained growth in
SRO/police presence in public elementary and secondary schools over time,
much remains unknown about the full suite of costs and benefits for students,
schools, and families attributable to these programs.3 What remains all but
assumed amid this uncertainty, however, is that a school’s SRO/police
presence helps fuel a “school-to-prison pipeline.”4
The growing school-to-prison pipeline research literature features two
general claims that frame key debates about how public schools approach
student discipline. One claim is that schools’ student discipline practices
1
See, e.g., #DefundThePolice, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/defu
ndthepolice/ [https://perma.cc/39CA-66PV] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021); Lissandra Villa, Why
Protesters Want to Defund Police Departments, TIME (June 7, 2020, 11:17 AM),
https://time.com/5849495/black-lives-matter-defund-police-departments/ [https://perma.cc/G
L39-JDJ2]; Rachel Hatzipanagos, What ‘Defund the Police’ Might Look Like, WASH. POST
(June 12, 2020, 11:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/06/12/black-livesmatter-defund-police-is-country-ready/ [https://perma.cc/9QZW-9EAE].
2
See, e.g., Nader Issa, Northside College Prep Votes to Remove Its CPD Officer, Becomes
First CPS School To Do So, CHI. SUN-TIMES (July 8, 2020, 7:59 PM), https://chicago.sun
times.com/education/2020/7/8/21316997/northside-college-prep-removes-chicacgo-policeofficer-first-cps-school [https://perma.cc/7NQQ-E9B7]; Ella Torres, Calls to Defund Police
Shine Light on the School-to-Prison Pipeline, ABC NEWS (June 18, 2020, 5:24 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/calls-defund-police-shine-light-school-prison-pipeline/story?id=
71195676 [https://perma.cc/9TTQ-ZNUK]; Katie Reilly, ‘Police Do Not Belong in Our
Schools.’ Student Are Demanding an End to Campus Cops After the Death of George Floyd,
TIME (June 5, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://time.com/5848959/school-contracts-police/
[https://perma.cc/2YQT-8EQQ]; Jessica Swarner, While the Push to Defund Phoenix Police
Grows Stronger, Activists Want Officers Out of Schools, COPPER COURIER (June 16, 2020,
10:44 AM), https://coppercourier.com/story/students-demand-remove-police-school-campusphoenix/ [https://perma.cc/A4CX-ZTKV].
3
See Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 919, 952 (2016) (observing the difficulty of measuring the effects of laws, practices,
and policies, including having law enforcement officers in schools, on students); Mario S.
Torres Jr. & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Demographics and Police Involvement: Implications
for Student Civil Liberties and Just Leadership, 45 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 450, 450, 468 (2009)
(examining the relationship between the use of law enforcement officers in schools and
criminalizing student offenses and discussing possible explanations for paradoxical findings);
Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on School Crime
and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 645 (2013) (concluding that
“more rigorous research” on the effects of police officers in schools is “absolutely essential”).
4
See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the Schools-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools For
Change, 48 ARIZ. L.J. 313, 338 (2016) (describing various causes contributing to the
emergence of a school-to-prison pipeline).
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have become increasingly legalized.5 A steadily increasing SRO/police
presence in the nation’s public schools both contributes to, and reflects, this
trend.6 Aside from an array of factors that help account for an increased
SRO/police presence in public schools, schools’ evolving posture towards
student discipline raises important policy concerns. An increasingly legalized
school environment may contribute to a net increase in overall school safety
and a concurrent decrease in school violence.7 Even if such benefits are
realized, important potential costs also lurk. Absent a truly randomized and
controlled experiment, efforts to assess and weigh the benefits and costs
associated with schools’ increasingly legalized approach toward student
discipline impose significant demands on potential research designs.
Notwithstanding important research design challenges, much of the
public and scholarly attention to schools’ evolving posture toward student
discipline dwells on the possible negative spill-over effects imposed on
students, their families, and schools.8 One potential cost that has attracted
particular scholarly (and public) attention involves students’ increased
exposure to the criminal justice system.9 Given the important stakes
involved, concerns about adverse implications for individual students and
their futures attributable to an increasingly legalized student discipline model
are important and warrant careful attention. This is especially so if schools’
motivations for this policy shift include a desire to functionally out-source a
greater share of responsibility for student discipline to law enforcement
agencies. Making matters worse is that referrals of student incidents to law
enforcement agencies—particularly for lower-level non-violent student
incidents that were traditionally handled internally within schools—often set
into motion a series of legal events that can culminate in ways that

5

See Henry A. Giroux, Racial Injustice and Disposable Youth in the Age of Zero
Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. IN EDUC. 553, 557 (2003); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing
for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 79, 88 (2008).
6
See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969–70 (using 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime
and Safety (“SSOCS”) data); Torres Jr. & Stefkovich, supra note 3, at 461, 463 (analyzing
1999–2000 SSOCS data); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 637 (analyzing various SSOCS
data sets).
7
See CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45251, SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS
6–8 (2018) (reviewing the research on whether school police programs reduce school violence
and concluding that “[t]he research that is available draws conflicting conclusions”).
8
See supra note 2 (examples of recent public attention); supra note 3 (examples of recent
scholarly work, especially empirical work).
9
See, e.g., Michael P. Krezmien, Peter E. Leone, Mark S. Zabloski & Craig S. Wells,
Juvenile Court Referrals and the Public Schools: Nature and Extent of the Practice in Five
States, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273, 275 (2010); Nance, supra note 3, at 953.
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deleteriously impact students’ lives.10 Operationalizing this first general
claim—that schools’ approach to student discipline is becoming increasingly
legalized—contributes to the following hypothesis: SRO/police presence (no
matter how small or large) at a school corresponds with an increase in the
likelihood that the school will report student discipline incidents to law
enforcement agencies. A related, though distinct, form of this hypothesis is
that as a school’s SRO/police presence increases so too does the likelihood
that the school will report student discipline incidents to law enforcement
agencies.
Persuaded that policy costs associated with schools’ increasingly
legalized approach to student discipline outweigh the benefits, many critics
quickly advance a second general claim: such a policy’s costs distribute
unequally across various traditional sub-groups of students.11 Thus, a second
hypothesis—an extension of the first—is that a school’s referrals of student
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies disproportionately
involve students of color, boys, students from low-income households, and
other vulnerable student sub-groups.
Despite both claims having already secured general acceptance in the
school-to-prison pipeline literature, we find mixed empirical support when
these two claims are subjected to the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set
on public school crime and safety, the U.S. Department of Education’s 2015–
2016 School Survey on Crime and Safety (“SSOCS”).12 With respect to the
first claim, we find evidence that a school’s SRO/police presence
corresponds with an increased likelihood that the school will report student
incidents to law enforcement agencies.13 Our finding on this first claim
generally comports with prior studies that analyze earlier versions of the
SSOCS data set.14
10

See infra Part I.A.3.
See, e.g., Janel George, Populating the Pipeline: School Policing and the Persistence
of the School-To-Prison Pipeline, 40 NOVA L. REV. 493, 494 (2016) ( “[C]hildren of color and
low-income children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by police in
schools.”); Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of
School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 180 (2015) (concluding that “there is
overwhelming evidence suggesting that students of color and students with disabilities are
funneled into the justice system due to the disparate impact of exclusionary discipline polices
and discretionary arrests in schools”); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 285–86 (2009) (finding evidence
of a relation between school poverty levels and number of student arrests).
12
Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the 2009–2010 restricted-use
version of the SSOCS data series.
13
See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
14
See, e.g., Nance, supra, note 3, at 969–70; Torres & Stefkovich, supra note 3, at 461–
63; Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 17–22.
11
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At the same time, however, we do not find direct empirical support for
the second claim: that school reports of student incidents to law enforcement
agencies systematically distribute unevenly across various student subgroups.15 Direct evidence on this specific claim is simply not possible owing
to the absence in the SSOCS data set of any individual-level demographic
data (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on students whose
conduct triggered a school referral to law enforcement agencies. To be clear,
however, this hypothesis remains a viable possibility as supportive anecdotal
and related evidence exists.16
Our narrower point is that there is no direct empirical support from the
SSOCS data set that school referrals to law enforcement raise troubling
distributional issues.17 Moreover, the weight of the indirect evidence from
school-level data similarly does not imply troubling distributional

15

See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do not permit
identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it remains
“entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of color”); see
also DANIEL J. LOSEN, NAT’L POLICY CTR., DISCIPLINE POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND
RACIAL JUSTICE 6–7 (2011), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education
/school-discipline/discipline-policies-successful-schools-and-racial-justice [https://perma.cc/
7VDR-LKHB]; Catherine P. Bradshaw, Mary M. Mitchell, Lindsey M. O’Brennan & Philip
J. Leaf, Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing to the Overrepresentation of Black
Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 508, 508 (2010) (discovering
that after controlling for teacher ratings of students’ behavior problems, Black students were
more likely than White students to be referred to the office for disciplinary reasons); Michael
Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the Antecedents of the “School-to-Jail”
Link: The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY
633, 653–54 (2011) (documenting that Black students are more likely than White students to
be disciplined even after taking into account other salient factors such as grades, attitudes,
gender, special education or language programs, and their conduct in school).
17
We note that language in at least one published paper—using earlier versions of the
SSOCS data set—invites some level of confusion by potentially advancing claims, albeit
tentatively, about the disproportionate impacts on minority student sub-groups based on data
on schools’ overall racial/ethnic, gender, and special education needs compositions. See Na &
Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 641 (“We conclude that the results of our tests of interaction with
percent in special education and percentage minority do not suggest a pattern of
disproportionate impact of police use on socially or educationally disadvantaged
populations.”). While perhaps such analyses provide not-implausible inferential support,
without individual-level racial/ethnic, gender and special education needs data on the actual
students referred to law enforcement agencies, more efficacious and helpful conclusions are
simply not possible given the data limitations. Contributing to the confusion is that the Na &
Gottfredson paper is aware of the unit of analysis limitation in the SSOCS data sets. See id. at
641–42 (“However, finer-grained analyses conducted at the individual-level might uncover
patterns that our school-level data could not.”).
16
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outcomes.18 Notably, the paucity of supportive empirical evidence from our
study generally contrasts with broader scholarly and public claims about
uneven distributions of school discipline across various student sub-groups.19
Our study of the relation between a school’s SRO/police presence and
the school’s likelihood of referring student disciplinary incidents to law
enforcement agencies seeks to contribute to the existing research literature in
three specific ways. First, our analyses exploit a more recent (2015-16)
version of the SSOCS data set.20 Second, our various models include such
complementary data on state-level mandatory reporting requirements as well
as district-level per pupil spending information.21 These complimentary data
provide helpful, and perhaps essential, controls for any modeling efforts.22
Third, we explore three distinct analytic approaches, including logistic
regression, fractional response regression, and Heckman selection
specifications in an effort to better isolate the possible independent influence
18

For similar results from earlier SSOCS data sets see, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, 972–73
(analyzing 2009–2010 SSOCS data); Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 620, 626, 640–41
(analyzing 2003–2004, 2005–2006, and 2007–2008 SSOCS data sets). See generally Michael
Heise & Jason P. Nance, To Report or Not to Report: Data on Schools, Student Discipline,
and the “School to Prison Pipeline,” (Cornell Law Sch. Rsch. Paper No. 20-39, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677247
[https://perma.cc/8MEJRSBA], for an extended discussion of possible reasons why student incidents reported to law
enforcement do not distribute unevenly across student racial sub-groups, which is particularly
surprising in light of substantial empirical support demonstrating that racial disparities persist
in other areas of education, the criminal justice system, and society generally.
19
See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, Towards A Problem-Solving Approach to Addressing Racial
Disparities in School Discipline Under Anti-Discrimination Law, 50 MEM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3571488 [https://pe
rma.cc/93UB-FKHA] (providing an overview of racial disparities that exist in school
exclusionary discipline); Russell J. Skiba, Robert S. Michael, Abra Carroll Nardo & Reece L.
Peterson, The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender Disproportionality in School
Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 319–20 (2002) (describing the overrepresentation of Black
students in the administration of school discipline); John M. Wallace, Jr., Sara Goodkind,
Cynthia M. Wallace & Jerald G. Bachman, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Differences in School
Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 47 (2008)
(finding that Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students are more likely to be subject to
exclusionary discipline than White and Asian American students); Jayanti Owens, Early
Childhood Behavior Problems and the Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in the United
States, 89 SOC. EDUC. 236, 253–54 (2016) (explaining that “[i]implicit stereotypes may lead
to increased grade retention and disproportionately harsh discipline, such as school suspension
or expulsion”); Lauren Camera, Boys Bear the Brunt of School Discipline, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (June 22, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-06-22/boysbear-the-brunt-of-school-discipline [https://perma.cc/KU28-5U4T] (explaining that “the same
behavior problems in boys and girls were penalized a lot more in boys than girls”).
20
See infra Part II.A.
21
See infra Part II.D.1.
22
See infra Part II.D.1.
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of a school’s SRO/police presence along with the magnitude of that presence
on a school’s student discipline reporting behavior.23
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes the relevant
research literatures. Part II describes our data and empirical strategy. We
present our results in Part III and consider their legal and policy implications.
We conclude in Part IV and discuss possible next steps for subsequent
research.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
While our Article seeks to both build on and extend the relevant
empirical literature, it also inevitably brushes up against two other related
research literatures that supply much needed analytic context. One such
literature seeks to explain the tightened intersections between schools and the
criminal justice system over the past few decades. A second, related research
literature endeavors to understand SRO/police officers’ increased role in
public schools and the consequences of this change.
A. THE TIGHTENED INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN SCHOOLS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

1. Evidence of Tightened Intersections Between Schools and the Criminal
Justice System
Over the last few decades intersections between schools and the
criminal justice system have tightened significantly.24 This trend can be
conceptualized in at least two ways. First, schools have increased their
reliance on various criminal justice oriented measures designed to intensify
student surveillance and deter violence and student wrongdoing.25 For
example, during the 2017–2018 school year, 83.5% of surveyed schools
reported that they used one or more security cameras to monitor students.26
This was a sizeable increase from the 1999–2000 school year, in which only

23

See infra Parts II.D, II.E.
See generally Jason P. Nance, The Intersection Between Schools and the Criminal
Justice System, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW 665–700 (James G. Dwyer
ed., 2020).
25
See Kelly Welch, School-to-Prison Pipeline, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE 1, 1–2 (Christopher J. Schreck ed., 2017).
26
MELISSA DILIBERTI, MICHAEL JACKSON, SAMUEL CORREA, ZOE PADGETT & RACHEL
HANSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CRIME, VIOLENCE,
DISCIPLINE, AND SAFETY IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS: FINDINGS FROM THE SCHOOL SURVEY ON
CRIME AND SAFETY: 2017–18, at 13 (2019).
24
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19.4% of schools indicated that they used security cameras.27 Also during the
2017–2018 school year, 95.4% of surveyed schools controlled access to
school buildings by locking or monitoring their doors (up from 74.6% in
1999–2000), 50.8% controlled access to school grounds by locking or
monitoring gates (up from 33.7% in 1999–2000), and 27.8% conducted one
or more “random sweeps for contraband” (up from 11.8% in 1999–2000).28
As discussed in more detail below, schools also have increasingly relied on
SRO/police officers in recent years to monitor students and deter violence
and criminal activity. Notably, many schools rely on various combinations
of these measures that, some argue, contribute to a quasi-prison-like
environment.29
Second, as a consequence of these tightened intersections between
schools and the criminal justice system, more students are becoming
involved with the criminal justice system, either as youth or when they reach
adulthood.30 Contributing to this are policies and practices, including state
statutes that require schools to notify law enforcement agencies when
students engage in certain wrongful acts. For example, states require schools
to report students to law enforcement when students commit violent acts such
as sexual assault31 and attacking another student with a weapon.32 Several
states also require schools to report students to law enforcement for various
nonviolent crimes, such as possession of illegal drugs,33 possession of

27
JILL F. DEVOE, KATHARIN PETER, MARGARET NOONAN, THOMAS D. SNYDER & KATRINA
BAUM, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME
AND SAFETY: 2005, at 106 (2005).
28
See id.; DILIBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.7.
Interestingly, fewer schools indicated that they performed one or more random metal detector
checks on students during the 2017–2018 school year (4.9%) than during the 1999–2000
school year (7.2%). DEVOE, PETER, NOONAN, SNYDER & BAUM, supra note 27, at 106;
DILBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13 tbl.7. However, more
schools required students to pass through metal detectors on a daily basis (0.9% during 1999–
2000 vs. 2.2% during 2017–2018). DEVOE, PETER, NOONAN, SNYDER & BAUM, supra note 27,
at 106; DILBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26, at 13.
29
See Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 94
IND. L.J. 47, 48–52 (2019); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of
School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79–85 (2008).
30
See Nance, supra note 4, at 321–324; Nance, supra note 3, at 955–56.
31
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(A)(30) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 1012.799
(2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-288(g) (2018).
32
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113(b)(1) (2018); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902(a)
(West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 4112(b)(3) (2021).
33
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184(a)(7), (b) (2018);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (West 2018).
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alcohol,34 theft,35 and vandalism.36 Other states require schools to report
students to law enforcement for the commission of any felony or
misdemeanor.37
State statutes that criminalize adolescent misbehavior in schools also
increase the likelihood of student engagement with the criminal justice
system. For example, many states have passed so-called “disturbing school
statutes,”38 which criminalize ordinary student misbehavior such as burping
in class39 or texting in class and refusing to turn over a cell phone.40 Some
estimate that thousands of students are charged each year for violating these
statutes.41 Moreover, school exclusionary disciplinary practices, including
suspension and expulsion, often are associated with increased student
involvement with the criminal justice system.42 When students are not in
school, they are more likely to be left at home unsupervised, which can
sometimes lead to involvement in criminal activity.43
Empirical studies also document the strong relationship that exists
between exclusionary discipline practices in schools and students’

34
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 33-210(1) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (2018); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 6A:16-6.4(a)(3)(i)–(ii) (West 2018).
35
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1002(1)(b) (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193D:4(I) (2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A(b)(4.1) (2018).
36
E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.154 (2018); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 13-1303A
(2018)(b)(4.1).
37
E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.130(b)(2) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6143(b)(1)
(2018); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.15 (2018).
38
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911(A)(1)(a)–(b) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 415.5(a)(1) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. § 871.01(1) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.635.030
(2018); see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, The School-to-Prison Pipeline’s Legal Architecture:
Lessons from the Spring Valley Incident and Its Aftermath, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 103–
04 (2017).
39
See A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2016).
40
See G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (D.N.M. 2013).
41
See Amanda Ripley, How America Outlawed Adolescence, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/11/how-america-outlawed-adolescence/
501149/ [https://perma.cc/PQX3-Y7WK]; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 38, at 103.
42
See TONY FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE CARMICHAEL,
MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, JUST. CTR. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T & PUB.
POL’Y RESEARCH INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW STUDENT
DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 70 (2011),
https://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/Breaking_School_Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MSV8-ZEFE].
43
See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and
Expulsion, 112 PEDIATRICS 1206, 1207 (2003).
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involvement with the criminal justice system as adults.44 Students suspended
in school were more likely to be arrested at some future point than those who
were not suspended, even after controlling for other variables that might
explain increased odds of arrest.45 School exclusionary discipline practices
also correspond with academic underachievement and failing to graduate
from high school;46 and failing to graduate from high school is associated
with involvement in the criminal justice system, either as a youth or as an
adult.47
One extreme category of exclusionary discipline that has received
considerable national attention are so-called “zero tolerance” policies. The
Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 required state legislatures to pass statutes that
expelled students for at least one year for bringing a firearm on school
campus as a condition for receiving federal education funds.48 The Act
validated the practice of zero tolerance for certain student infractions and
precipitated a new disciplinary mindset in many school districts across the

44

See Thomas Mowen & John Brent, School Discipline as a Turning Point: The
Cumulative Effect of Suspension on Arrest, 53 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 628, 642–43
(2016); Kerrin C. Wolf & Aaron Kupchik, School Suspension and Adverse Experiences in
Adulthood, 34 JUST. Q. 407, 421–22 (2017); Tracey L. Shollenberger, Racial Disparities in
School Suspension and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR
EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 31, 36–40 (Daniel J. Losen ed., 2015).
45
Mowen & Brent, supra note 44, at 642–43; Wolf & Kupchik, supra note 44, at 421–22.
46
See, e.g., FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra
note 42, at 54–59 (finding that students experiencing exclusionary discipline, who otherwise
had statistically identical profiles to those who had not experienced exclusionary discipline,
were more likely to drop out of school); Robert Balfanz, Vaughan Byrnes & Joanna Fox, Sent
Home and Put Off-Track: The Antecedents, Disproportionalities, and Consequences of Being
Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED RSCH. ON CHILDREN 1, 9 (2014) (finding that, after
controlling for course performance, attendance, and student demographics, a single
suspension in the ninth grade increased the odds of dropping out of school from 16% to 32%,
and each additional suspension increased the odds by 20%); see also Jeffery H. Lamont, Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics, Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 131
PEDIATRICS e1000, e1001 (2013) (“[S]tudents who experience out-of-school suspension and
expulsion are as much as 10 times more likely to ultimately drop out of high school than are
those who do not.”).
47
See NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT
15 (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds., 2014), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstat
bb/nr2014 [https://perma.cc/SFJ2-NU5B] (explaining that high school dropouts are more
likely to be institutionalized than those who are more educated); CLIVE R. BELFIELD, HENRY
M. LEVIN & RACHEL ROSEN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPPORTUNITY YOUTH 20 (2012),
https://aspencommunitysolutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Economic_Value_of_Op
portunity_Youth_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5QK-ACCN] (observing that “[e]ducation
levels are strongly correlated with criminal activity”).
48
20 U.S.C. § 7961.
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nation.49 Zero tolerance policies require school authorities to administer
specific disciplinary consequences when students engage in certain behavior,
regardless of the surrounding circumstances, the severity, or the results of the
behavior.50 These policies now extend beyond bringing a gun to campus and
apply to infractions like possession of illegal drugs, tobacco, alcohol, sharp
objects, or over-the-counter medication, dress code violations, tardiness,
truancy, and fighting.51 Zero tolerance policies have led to severe disciplinary
consequences for behavior such as bringing cough drops, fingernail clippers,
scissors, squirt guns, and pocketknives to school, drawing a picture of a
weapon, authoring a violent story, and pretending to shoot a gun with one’s
hands.52 Scholars and youth advocates have criticized zero tolerance policies
as ineffective, counterproductive, and unnecessarily putting students at risk
of increased involvement with the criminal justice system.53
Significantly, many scholars and commentators also have pointed out
that the tightened intersections between schools and the criminal justice
system impact various student groups differently. For example, studies imply
that schools serving higher concentrations of students of color have
comparatively greater rates of employing various combinations of
surveillance measures.54 These findings persist even after controlling for
49
See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero
Tolerance in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2012)
(“Passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act signaled an important validation of zero tolerance
school discipline practices by the federal government . . . .”).
50
Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in
Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCH. 852, 852 (2008).
51
See CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79–80 (2010) (describing the expansion of zero
tolerance policies beyond expulsions for possessing firearms); DEREK W. BLACK, ENDING
ZERO TOLERANCE: THE CRISIS OF ABSOLUTE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 3 (2016).
52
See BLACK, supra note 51, at 2–4.
53
See Am. Psych. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, supra note 50, at 857; Derek W.
Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 837–41
(2015); ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 17 (2000),
https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/opportunitiessuspended-the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/cr
p-opportunities-suspended-zero-tolerance-2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ5F-J5RY].
54
See Jason P. Nance, Student Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias,
66 EMORY L.J. 765, 810–11 (2017) [hereinafter Nance, Student Surveillance] (finding that
“higher concentrations of minority students are predictive of greater odds that schools rely
on . . . designated combinations of security measures”); Jason P. Nance, Students, Security,
and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 27–43 (2013) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race]
(finding that “a school’s percentage of minority students is a strong predictor of whether a
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other school characteristics and student demographic information such as
student poverty, the percentage of students performing poorly on academic
assessments, school crime, school disorder and disciplinary problems, and
school administrators’ perceptions of the level of criminal activity in the
surrounding neighborhoods.55
Likewise, scholars have written extensively about racial disparities in
suspensions and expulsions.56 Similar to the use of security measures, many
scholars find that racial disparities persist after controlling for factors such as
student misbehavior, poverty, academic achievement, neighborhood context,
and district and school characteristics.57 However, other scholars have
observed that these uneven distributions of school discipline across various
student sub-groups are complex. For example, empirical studies show that

school uses a combination of strict security measures”); see also Jeremy D. Finn & Timothy
J. Servoss, Security Measures and Discipline in American High Schools, in CLOSING THE
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE EXCLUSION 44, 49 (Daniel J.
Losen ed., 2015) [hereinafter Finn & Servoss, Security Measures] (“[T]he percentage of Black
students enrolled was more highly related to security levels than was any other
characteristic.”); Timothy J. Servoss & Jeremy D. Finn, School Security: For Whom and with
What Results?, 13 LEADERSHIP & POLICY IN SCHS. 61, 79–80 (2014) [hereinafter Servoss &
Finn, School Security] (“In sum, a high proportion of Black students in a school is related to
the degree of security the school implements above and beyond all other characteristics we
studied.”); Katarzyna T. Steinka-Fry, Benjamin W. Fisher & Emily Tanner-Smith, Visible
School Security Measures Across Diverse Middle and High School Settings: Typologies and
Predictors, 11 J. APPLIED SEC. RSCH. 422, 424 (2016) (finding that a school’s use of intense
security measures was associated with serving higher concentrations of African American and
low-income students).
55
Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 54, at 805–11; Nance, Students, Security, and
Race, supra note 54, at 32–41; Finn & Servoss, Security Measures, supra note 54, at 49;
Servoss & Finn, School Security, supra note 54, at 431.
56
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION
DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 7 (2014); Russell J. Skiba, Mariella I Arredondo &
Natasha T. Williams, More Than a Metaphor: The Contribution of Exclusionary Discipline to
a School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546, 550–51 (2014); DANIEL J.
LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF
DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 12, 18–19 (2012); Girvan, supra note 19, at 5–7.
57
See Yolanda Anyon, Jeffrey M. Jenson, Inna Altschul, Jordan Farrar, Jeanette
McQueen, Eldridge Greer, Barbara Downing & John Simmons, The Persistent Effect of Race
and the Promise of Alternatives to Suspension in School Discipline Outcomes, 44 CHILD. &
YOUTH SERV. REV. 379, 380 (2014); Russell J. Skiba, Robert H. Horner, Choong-Geun Chung,
M. Karega Rausch, Seth L. May & Tary Tobin, Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation
of African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCH. 85,
95–101 (2011); Russell J. Skiba, Choong-Geun Chung, Megan Trachok, Timberly Baker,
Adam Sheya & Robin Hughes, Where Should We Intervene? Contributions of Behavior,
Student, and School Characteristics in Out-of-School Suspension, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE GAP: EQUITABLE REMEDIES FOR EXCESSIVE DISCIPLINE 132, 132–34 (Daniel J.
Losen ed., 2015).
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Black students are not subject to exclusionary discipline at higher rates than
other students for more serious and objectively defined offenses, especially
when discipline is mandated for engaging in such offenses.58 But Black
students are suspended and expelled at higher rates for less serious offenses
and for offenses where discipline is discretionary.59
Much less has been written about racial disparities in referrals to law
enforcement or school-based arrests. Data from the U.S. Department of
Education Office for Civil Rights’ Civil Rights Data Collection report racial
disproportionalities at a national level,60 and others have used these data to
document disparities at a state level,61 but comparatively less empirical work
in this area has been conducted at the school level.
One exception includes empirical work from Matthew Theriot, who
“compared the number of arrests in three consecutive school years at thirteen
schools with an SRO and fifteen schools without an SRO in one school
district.”62 Theriot found that economic disadvantage in schools was
positively related to the number of school-based arrests.63 He also found that
58
See FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra note
42, at 45; Erik J. Girvan, Cody Gion, Kent McIntosh & Keith Smolkowski, The Relative
Contribution of Subjective Office Referrals to Racial Disproportionality in School Discipline,
32 SCH. PSYCH. Q. 392, 400–402 (2017); see also Girvan, supra note 19, at 11–12 (discussing
studies showing that Black students tend to be disciplined more often when discipline is
discretionary for more minor offenses rather than when discipline is mandatory for more
serious offenses).
59
See FABELO, THOMPSON, PLOTKIN, CARMICHAEL, MARCHBANKS & BOOTH, supra note
42, at 45; Girvan, Gion, McIntosh & Smolkowski, supra note 58, at 397; Girvan, supra note
19, at 11-12; Keith Smolkowski, Erik J. Girvan, Kent McIntosh, Rhonda N. T. Nese & Robert
H. Horner, Vulnerable Decision Points for Disproportionate Office Discipline Referrals:
Comparisons of Discipline for African American and White Elementary School Students, 41
BEHAV. DISORDERS 178, 184 (2016).
60
See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFF. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DATA COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT:
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 1, 6 (2014) (“Black students represent 16% of student enrollment, 27% of
students referred to law enforcement, and 31% of students subjected to a school-related
arrest.”); see also Emily M. Homer & Benjamin W. Fisher, Police in Schools and Student
Arrest Rates Across the United States: Examining Differences by Race, Ethnicity, and Gender,
19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 192, 198–199 (2020) (examining the 2013–2014 Civil Rights Data
Collection and finding that “Black students’ arrest rates were higher . . . by 1.22 students per
1,000,” and “Hispanic students’ arrest rates were higher by 0.55 students per 1,000” in schools
with police).
61
See, e.g., Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at
School, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/blackstudents-more-likely-to-be-arrested.html?r=1131109146
[https://perma.cc/MAK2-66LE]
(stating that “[i]n 43 states and the District of Columbia, black students are arrested at school
at disproportionately high levels”).
62
See Theriot, supra note 11, at 282.
63
Id. at 284.
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“the number of arrests [did] not change as poverty levels change[d] at schools
with an SRO.”64
Another notable exception involves David Ramey’s analysis of data
from the 2009–2010 U.S. Department of Education Civil Rights Data
Collection and the 2009–2010 National Center for Education Statistics
Common Core Data. Ramey examined, among other factors, the relationship
between school-level and district-level racial/ethnic and poverty
compositions and rates of referrals to law enforcement and school-based
arrests.65 While Ramey’s study controls for demographics and school
characteristics, it does not account for either state mandatory reporting
requirements or examine the effect of schools having regular contact with an
SRO or other law enforcement officer.66 Ramey found that schools serving
higher concentrations of Black students were associated with higher rates of
student arrests and referrals to law enforcement.67 He also found that schools
and districts serving higher concentrations of impoverished students had
higher rates of student criminalization.68
Finally, F. Chris Curran and his colleagues examined the effects of SRO
programs on students in two mid-sized suburban school districts in the South,
including the frequency of student arrests.69 The school districts contained
approximately fifty schools, all of which had an SRO.70 While the two
districts generally served a student population that was mostly white and
affluent, the schools’ student characteristics varied substantially with respect
to race and ethnicity and socioeconomic status.71 Notably, these researchers
“tended to see little variation in the practices of SROs across these schools.”72
Specifically, they observed that “SROs tended to view the risk of threats and
their approaches to school discipline similarly, regardless of the racial
composition of the school.”73

64

Id.
See David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School
Discipline, 88 SOC. EDUC. 181, 187 (2015).
66
See id. at 192.
67
Id. at 189, 192.
68
Id. at 192.
69
F. CHRIS CURRAN, BENJAMIN W. FISHER, SAMANTHA L. VIANO & AARON KUPCHIK,
UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL SAFETY AND THE USE OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN
UNDERSTUDIED SETTINGS 7, 32 (2020).
70
Id. at 7.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 33.
73
Id.
65
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2. Why Intersections Between Schools and the Criminal Justice System
Have Tightened
Scholars have proposed several interrelated theories for why schools
have increased their reliance on criminal justice-oriented security measures
and punitive policies over the past decades. Some point to a backdrop of a
“tough on crime” mindset that was present throughout various regions of the
country and manifested by laws such as truth-in-sentencing laws,74 minimum
prison sentence laws,75 and habitual offender laws.76 Consistent with this
backdrop, when juvenile violent crime rates escalated from the mid-1980s to
1994, many legislative and executive bodies focused on punishing criminal
behavior rather than on rehabilitating youth offenders.77 Scholars argue that
a parallel approach was adopted by schools to address student discipline
problems, where some policymakers and school authorities focused on
punishment, rather than rehabilitation, by suspending, expelling, or referring
students to law enforcement when students violated school rules.78
Scholars and commentators also observed that several highly-publicized
acts of school violence, such as those that occurred at Columbine High
School and Sandy Hook Elementary School, motivated many school
authorities to intensify student surveillance and adopt punitive disciplinary
74
The majority of states in the 1980s and 1990s enacted statutes that mandated persons
convicted of crimes to serve at least 85% of their prison sentences. See PAULA M. DITTON &
DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (1999).
75
See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended in various sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
76
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2012).
77
See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 189–90 (1999); PATRICIA TORBET, RICHARD GABLE, HUNTER HURST IV, IMOGENE
MONTGOMERY, LINDA SZYMANSKI & DOUGLAS THOMAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, at xi (1996) (documenting states’
legislative and executive action shift in approach to address juvenile crime); Elizabeth S. Scott,
“Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
71, 94 (2013) (“The hostility and fear that characterized attitudes toward young offenders in
the 1990s resulted in policies and decisions driven primarily by immediate public safety
concerns and the goal of punishing young criminals.”). For example, several states passed
laws to facilitate the transfer of juveniles to criminal court to be tried as adults. See Donna M.
Bishop & Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice in the Get Tough Era, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2766, 2768 (G. Bruinsma & D. Weisburd eds., 2014).
78
See KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH
SCHOOL 164 (2011); Henry Armand Giroux, Racial Injustice and Disposable Youth in the Age
of Zero Tolerance, 16 QUALITATIVE STUD. EDUC. 553, 561 (2003) (observing that zero
tolerance policies were modeled on minimum prison sentences laws and habitual offender
laws); Hirschfield, supra note 29, at 90; Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2016).
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policies.79 Such events, which commanded national attention for sustained
periods of time, instilled fear and concern in many parents, students, and
community members.80 School authorities and policymakers sometimes
experienced pressure to demonstrate that they were creating safe
environments for children.81 Security measures and “get tough” policies and
practices were concrete actions that school authorities and policymakers
could take to appease their constituencies.
Scholars further theorize that some schools increased their reliance on
intense surveillance measures and punitive discipline policies because they
lack resources to adequately address student misbehavior and create orderly
learning environments.82 Some students have severe learning disabilities, live
in families that lack behavioral structure, have acute behavioral disorders,
suffer from trauma, anxiety, malnutrition, lack adequate health care, live in
neglectful, abusive home environments, and move frequently or are
homeless.83 Students often misbehave or violate school rules when their
needs are not met, they are harassed by their peers, or when they are
frustrated or embarrassed because they cannot meet grade-level
79
See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 541 (2013) (explaining that after the Columbine
shootings “legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws, making it
a crime to threaten violence in schools”); Nance, Students, Security, and Race, supra note 54,
at 3.
80
See Lynh Bui, Montgomery County Parents Ask for More School Security, Teacher
Training During Budget Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:15 PM), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/blogs/maryland-schools insider/post/montgomery-county-parents-ask-for-m
ore-schoolsecurity-teacher-training-during-budget-hearing/2013/01/11/e8d3dcf4-5aab-11e29fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_blog.html [https://perma.cc/TBE4-2P2E]; Motoko Rich, School Officials
Look Again at Security Measures Once Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/education/after-newtown-shootings-schools-considerarmed-security-officers.html [https://perma.cc/3KVN-9PW9].
81
See Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security and the
Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 336 (2003);
Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE:
CULTURES OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 1, 2–3 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres
eds., 2009) (“[T]he threat of ‘another Columbine’ (or Virginia Tech, and so on) haunts the
social imagery, leading parents, policy makers, and others to the sober conclusion that any
security measure is worth whatever trade-offs are involved in order to ensure safety.”).
82
See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of Punishment:
Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 341, 342 (2003); Hirschfield,
supra note 29, at 92.
83
See DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT
AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 290–91 (2013); Linda Darling-Hammond,
Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take to Close the Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING
THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD A CHANCE 77, 83
(Prudence L. Carter & Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013).
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expectations.84 Instead of addressing various unmet needs, some schools
resort to referring students to law enforcement or relying on other
exclusionary disciplinary measures designed to push misbehaving students
out of school to help maintain order and control.85
Relatedly, scholars also contend that increased pressure from external
constituencies to demonstrate student achievement may be another driving
force behind the adoption of punitive disciplinary measures and practices.86
Over the last decades, federal and state education accountability laws, such
as the now defunct No Child Left Behind Act, required schools to regularly
test students to measure whether students met certain academic standards.87
Schools failing to meet these imposed standards might be subject to various
sanctions or receive a negative label, putting school authorities’ jobs in
jeopardy.88 Pushing disruptive or low-performing students out of school
could be a method to conserve limited resources to help schools meet
statutory expectations and avoid sanctions.
3. Consequences of These Tightened Intersections
As previously explained, much of the public and scholarly attention
focuses on individual and social costs flowing from more students becoming
involved in the criminal justice system. Because such involvement can create
adverse implications for students, their futures, their families, and society,
concerns about these tightened intersections warrant careful attention.
One end result for some youth who become involved in the criminal
justice system is incarceration. Obviously, the impacts of incarceration on
youth can be—and invariably are—severe. Incarceration for youth
corresponds with (indeed, drives) limited future educational, employment,
and housing opportunities,89 reduced odds of graduating from high school,90

84

See Noguera, supra note 82, at 342.
See Hirschfield, supra note 29, at 92; Noguera, supra note 82, at 342, 345.
86
See FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 10 (2010);
Linda Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No
Child Left Behind,’ 10 RACE, ETHNICITY, & EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); James E. Ryan, The
Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 (2004).
87
See Nance, Student Surveillance, supra note 54, at 781–82.
88
Id.
89
See RIYA SAHA SHAH & JEAN STROUT, JUV. L. CTR., FUTURE INTERRUPTED: THE
COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY PROLIFERATION OF JUVENILE RECORDS 10–11 (2016);
BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUST. POL’Y INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE
IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 9 (2006).
90
See Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile Incarceration, Human Capital, and
Future Crime: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 130 Q. J. ECON. 759, 799 (2015).
85
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mental health concerns,91 a reinforcement of violent attitudes and
behaviors,92 and an increased likelihood of future involvement in the criminal
justice system.93 In addition, even student arrests that do not lead to
incarceration correspond with undesirable conditions. An arrest can lead to
emotional trauma, embarrassment, stigma, expulsion from school, and a
reduced probability of graduating from high school.94
B. A GROWING SRO/POLICE PRESENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

1. Evidence of and Explanations for a Growing SRO/Police Presence in
Public Schools
A key component of the tightened intersection between schools and the
criminal justice system involves a growing SRO/police presence in public
schools. Many schools rely on SRO/police officers to assist with student
surveillance, deter school violence and student wrongdoing, and help create
an orderly school environment.95
91

See Christopher B. Forrest, Ellen Tambor, Anne W. Riley, Margaret E. Ensminger &
Barbara Starfield, The Health Profile of Incarcerated Male Youths, 105 PEDIATRICS 286, 288–
89 (2000); Javad H. Kashani, George W. Manning, Donald H. McKnew, Leon Cytryn, John
F. Simonds & Phil C. Wooderson, Depression Among Incarcerated Delinquents, 3
PSYCHIATRY RSCH. 185, 190–91 (1980).
92
See Anne M. Hobbs, Timbre Wulf-Ludden & Jenna Strawhun, Assessing Youth Early
in the Juvenile Justice System, 3 J. JUV. JUST. 80, 81 (2013); Mark J. Van Ryzin & Thomas J.
Dishion, From Antisocial Behavior to Violence: A Model for the Amplifying Role of Coercive
Joining in Adolescent Friendships, 54 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 661, 661 (2013)
(explaining that coercive friendships during adolescent years predict violent behavior in
adulthood).
93
See ANTHONY PETROSINO, CAROLYN TURPIN-PETROSINO & SARAH GUCKENBURG,
FORMAL SYSTEM PROCESSING OF JUVENILES: EFFECTS ON DELINQUENCY 25–36 (2010); Brent
B. Benda & Connie L. Tollett, A Study of Recidivism of Serious and Persistent Offenders
Among Adolescents, 27 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 111, 113 (1999).
94
See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO
JAILHOUSE TRACK 12 (2005); Theriot, supra note 11, at 281; Gary Sweeten, Who Will
Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST.
Q. 462, 471–77 tbl.5 (2006); Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile
Arrests on High School Dropout, 82 SOC. EDUC. 368, 373 (2009).
95
In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a survey to identify the reasons why
schools had SROs. See LAWRENCE F. TRAVIS III & JULIE KIERNAN COON, CTR. FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
SAFETY: A NATIONAL SURVEY 85 (2005), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2116
76.pdf. 42% of the principals surveyed indicated that “[n]ational media attention about school
violence” was the primary reason; 17.5% indicated “[d]isorder problems (e.g., rowdiness,
vandalism); 6.1% indicated that “[p]arents wanted an officer in the school;” 3.7% indicated
that it was the “[l]evel of violence in the school;” and 48.2% indicated that it was for “[o]ther”
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The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO)
believes that “[s]chool-based policing is the fastest-growing area of law
enforcement.”96 Evidence documenting claims of a steadily growing police
presence in public schools remains largely uncontested. While in the “late
1970s” the total number of police officers assigned to public schools was
fewer than 100,97 by 2007 the number approached almost 20,000.98
Complementing the rapid growth in the raw number of SRO/police
assigned to schools is the increasing percentage of schools that report a police
presence. More precise estimates of this increase derive from SSOCS data
sets. For example, 2007–2008 SSOCS data (weighted) reveal an SRO/police
official was present at least one day a week in 21.1% of the sampled
schools.99 The 2015–2016 SSOCS data set reveals that in less than one
decade the percentage (50%) more than doubled.100 While both the absolute
growth in SRO/police officers in schools as well as the relative share of
schools that use them are well understood, reasons explaining these growth
trends are comparatively less understood. Scholars observe that schools’
reliance on SRO/police has increased in tandem with reliance on criminal
justice-oriented measures and punitive discipline policies for the reasons
discussed above.101 Many point to rising youth crime rates from the mid1980s to 1994 and highly-publicized incidents of school violence as major
driving forces for the increase.102
reasons. Id. at 85; see also CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 18–22
(describing activities of SROs in schools).
96
About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://www.nasro.org/mai
n/about-nasro/ [https://perma.cc/4X5H-RV52] (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
97
Nance, supra note 3, at 946; Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, SchoolPolice Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools: An Analysis of New York City’s Impact
Schools Initiative, 39 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 455, 457 (2007); Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna
Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the Criminalization of School
Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 1 (2011).
98
See NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43126, SCHOOL
RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 20 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp
/crs/misc/R43126.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BJX-M43Z].
99
Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 632–33.
100
See infra Part II.D.2, tbl.1 (displaying results from weighted sample).
101
See supra Part I.A.2.
102
See, e.g., CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 16–17; Ben Brown,
Evaluations of School Policing Programs, in THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 327, 327 (Jo Deakin, Emmeline
Taylor & Aaron Kupchik eds., 2018); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Reevaluating School Searches
Following School-to-Prison Pipeline Reforms, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2013, 2015 (2019);
Theriot, supra note 11, at 280. Following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida in 2018, the
Florida State Legislature mandated that “each district school board and school district
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Another likely source of this growth involves the availability of public
funds to hire SRO/police officers. In the aftermath of the tragic shootings at
Columbine High School the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of
Community Policing Services initiated and implemented the “COPS in
Schools” grant program in 1999.103 According to the most recent publiclyavailable financial data, the COPS program has awarded around $914 million
in grants to help hire more than 7,967 SROs.104 Additional federal funding
sources include a collaborative effort involving the U.S. Departments of
Justice, Education, and Health and Human Services. During its first decade
(1999–2009), the resultant “Safe Schools/Healthy Students” program has
provided more than $2.1 billion for an array of programs, including those that
help fund SROs in schools.105 Several states also provide funding to support
bringing SROs into schools.106
Interestingly, lawmakers, police departments, and school officials
continue to place more SRO/police into schools even though strikingly little
is known about SRO/police programs’ effectiveness in terms of increasing
school safety and decreasing school violence and crime.107 To be sure, it
remains difficult to over-emphasize the benefits associated with increases in
school safety and decreases in school violence and crime. Whether bolstering
a school’s SRO/police presence in fact contributes to realizing such goals
superintendent shall partner with law enforcement agencies or security agencies to establish
or assign one or more safe-school officers at each school facility within the district . . . .” FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 1006.12 (2020).
103
Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 620–21.
104
MARIEKE BROCK, NORMA KRIGER & RAMÓN MIRÓ, LIBR. CONGR., SCHOOL SAFETY
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 1990–2016 at
78, 79, 81 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251517.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q
U6S-Y66W].
105
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Awards More
Than $32.8 Million to Promote Safe Schools, Healthy Students (July 10, 2009),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-awards-more-328-millionpromote-safe-schools-healthy-students [https://perma.cc/C3G5-7Y6G]; KELLIE ANDERSON,
LAURA TOWVIM, JANE REPETTI, NIKITA CARNEY, JOHN ROSIAK, BENJAMIN THOMAS &
CHRISTINE BLABER, SAFE SCHOOLS, HEALTHY STUDENTS, NAT’L CTR. MENTAL HEALTH PROM.
& YOUTH VIOLENCE PREV., EDUC. DEV. CTR., LAW ENFORCEMENT: SNAPSHOTS FROM THE SAFE
SCHOOLS/HEALTHY STUDENTS INITIATIVE 11 (2013) (discussing Safe Schools/Healthy
Students funding to hire SROs in schools).
106
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2 (2020) (allocating funding for “safety plans
involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school safety resource
officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school environment.”); 24 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 13-1302-A (2020) (authorizing grants to cover costs associated with compensating
school resource officers).
107
See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 98, at 9; see also Na & Gottfredson, supra note
3, at 624–25 (criticizing most evaluations of SRO programs as limited to descriptive statistics
and various self-reported perceptions of school and student safety).
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remains uncertain, but evidence of possible negative costs attributable to a
school’s SRO/police presence is comparatively less uncertain and, in any
event, warrants attention.
The precise roles, responsibilities, and day-to-day work of SRO/police
officers vary considerably across the nation and from school to school. As
Ben Brown observes, the American law enforcement apparatus itself is
“decentralized and fragmented,” being composed of various federal, state,
and local agencies that report to various constituencies and have differing
responsibilities, authorities, and funding sources.108 A relatively small group
of SRO/police is embedded within this fragmented apparatus and works for
a variety of agencies that include county sheriff departments, municipal
police departments, and school district police departments.109 Scholars who
have studied SRO/police officer programs have observed a great variety and
breadth of services that SRO/police provide to schools throughout the
country.110
Nevertheless, one common and unsurprising category of SRO/police
activities that scholars and commentators consistently identify is “law
enforcement-related activities,” including investigating complaints,
minimizing disruptions, patrolling school grounds, and maintaining order.111
SRO/police appear to have the legal authority to intervene in nearly all
student disciplinary matters, as states commonly criminalize actions such as
assault, disorderly conduct, larceny, and disturbing the peace.112 They also
may enforce the so-called “disturbing school statutes” discussed above.113
108

See Brown, supra note 102, at 328–29.
Id. at 329.
110
See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 18–22; PETER FINN,
MICHAEL SHIVELY, JACK MCDEVITT, WILLIAM LASSITER & TOM RICH, COMPARISON OF
PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO)
PROGRAMS 14–18 (2005); AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN
AGE OF FEAR 82–95 (2010); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 37–39; see also Brown,
supra note 102, at 329–330.
111
See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 98, at 2; KUPCHIK, supra note 110, at 83–89;
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2039; Theriot, supra note 11, at 281. According to the COPS
program, one of the primary duties of SROs is to “address crime and disorder problems, gangs,
and drug activities affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school.” 42
U.S.C. § 3796dd-8(4)(A).
112
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 241 (West 2018) (criminalizing assault); FLA. STAT.
§ 877.03 (2018) (criminalizing acts that breach the peace and disorderly conduct); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 155.05 (McKinney 2018) (criminalizing larceny); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (2018)
(criminalizing disorderly conduct).
113
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West
2018); FLA. STAT. § 871.01 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.635.030 (2018); see also GuptaKagan, supra note 38, at 103; Kerrin C. Wolf, Arrest Decision Making by School Resource
Officers, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 137, 147 (2014).
109
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Consequently, many scholars worry about the blurred lines that have
emerged between “administering law enforcement” and “disciplining
adolescent misbehavior.”114 One scholar observes that school resource
officers have become the “new authoritative agents” of school discipline, as
“the introduction of law enforcement officers into schools has transformed
student misconduct into a matter to be dealt with by the criminal justice
system.”115
Scholars, particularly legal scholars, also have expressed concern that a
sustained law enforcement presence in schools imposes additional strains on
students’ already limited constitutional rights.116 For example, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that school authorities do not need to obtain a
warrant or show probable cause to lawfully search a student.117 The majority
of courts also have applied this lower standard when evaluating the legality
of student searches conducted by SRO/police officers, even when evidence
obtained from SRO searches subsequently is used for prosecution
purposes.118 Courts also have held that school officials do not need to provide
Miranda warnings before interrogating a student about potential
wrongdoing,119 even when they subsequently provide the evidence they
obtain to law enforcement,120 and even when a law enforcement officer is
present during the interrogation.121

114

See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 38, at 102–07; Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing Students’
Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 222–25 (2018);
Fedders, supra note 78, at 573–74; Joseph B. Ryan, Antonis Katsiyannis, Jennifer M. Counts
& Jill C. Shelnut, The Growing Concerns Regarding School Resources Officers, 53
INTERVENTION SCH. & CLINIC 188, 188 (2018).
115
Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A Conceptual and
Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 591, 596 (2006).
116
See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2015–18; Nance, supra note 3, at 936–40;
Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 861–65 (2012);
Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1067, 1067–70 (2003).
117
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985).
118
See, e.g., People v. Dillworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); R.D.S. v. State, 245
S.W.3d 356, 367–69 (Tenn. 2008); see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 102, at 2024–30.
119
See, e.g., C.S. v. Couch, 843 F. Supp. 2d 894, 917–20 (N.D. Ind. 2011); Boynton v.
Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Me. 1982).
120
See, e.g., S.E. v. Grant Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 640–41 (6th Cir. 2008).
121
See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Tateana
R., 883 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); J.D. v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d
721, 723–25 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
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2. Empirical Assessments of SRO/Police Presence in Schools
Framed by research literatures that explore the concurrent growth of
high stakes student discipline policies and the growing presence of
SRO/police in schools, this Article seeks to directly engage with the related
nascent empirical literature. We seek to explore the potential relationship
between the presence of SRO/police in a school and that school’s likelihood
of referring student discipline matters to law enforcement agencies.
In earlier leading empirical work on this topic, one of the authors of this
Article finds that “a police officer’s regular presence at a school is predictive
of greater odds that school officials refer students to law enforcement . . . .
including [for] seemingly minor offenses.”122 While Nance’s prior work
remains important, it uses an earlier (2009–2010) SSOCS data set. Moreover,
Nance’s earlier analyses rely on raw rather than weighted data, do not include
per pupil spending information, and pursue slightly different empirical
strategies than those pursued here. Any technical or coding adjustments
notwithstanding, in many ways this Article seeks to update, expand, and
build upon Nance’s earlier influential work.
Other scholars have also exploited earlier versions of the SSOCS data
set. Na and Gottfredson, for example, drew from the 2007–2008 SSOCS data
set and found results that generally comport with Nance’s subsequent study
finding a positive relation between the number of SRO/police officers at a
school and that school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law
enforcement.123 Unlike Nance’s study, however, Na and Gottfredson’s
models do not control for factors as a state’s mandatory reporting
requirements. Despite important methodological limitations, Na and
Gottfredson went on to conclude, in part, that the addition of police officers
in schools correlated with a move to “redefine disciplinary situations as
criminal justice problems rather than social, psychological, or academic
problems, and accordingly increases the likelihood that students are arrested
at school.”124 Interestingly, as it relates to the “conventional wisdom”
surrounding concerns with distributional issues incident to the school-toprison pipeline hypothesis, Na and Gottfredson found “no evidence of
adverse impact of police officer presence on minority groups or on special
education populations.”125 Of course, Na and Gottfredson’s conclusion
pivots on school-level racial/ethnic (and other) data as opposed to student122

Nance, supra note 3, at 927.
See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 639, 640. It is perhaps worth noting that in
supplemental analyses Na and Gottfredson drew on even earlier SSOCS data sets (2003–2004,
2005–2006, 2007–2008). See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 637.
124
Id. at 642.
125
Id.
123
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level data on the actual students involved in school reports to law
enforcement agencies. Indeed, Nance, using similar SSOCS data sets,
concluded that strong distributional claims about school reporting practices
were not prudent given the data limitations.126
We have thus far not found any published article that focuses on a
possible relationship between a school’s rate of reporting incidents to law
enforcement officials and the presence—as well as magnitude—of law
enforcement officials at the schools using the more recent 2015–2016
SSOCS data set.127 We are similarly unaware of any published work that
includes statistical controls for state reporting requirements and student per
pupil spending. Finally, we are similarly unfamiliar with any published work
that estimates selection models.
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our study uses the nation’s leading cross-sectional data set on public
school crime and safety and supplements those data with complementary
information from other leading and long-standing data sets. We test our
various research hypotheses with three different, though related, empirical
specifications.
A. DATA

The main source of data for this study draws from the U.S. Department
of Education’s School Survey on Crime and Safety for the 2015–2016 school
year (“SSOCS”).128 We use the restricted-access version of the SSOCS data
set that benefits from more granular school-level counts of the number of
student disciplinary incidents that schools reported to law enforcement

126
See Nance, supra note 3, at 973 (noting that while the SSOCS data do not permit
identification of the students who were actually referred to law enforcement, it remains
“entirely possible” that the school referrals were “disproportionately students of color”).
127
We want to acknowledge that the U.S. Department of Education has published a report
that both promotes and summarizes a few variables from the SSOCS 2017–2018 data set. See
generally DILIBERTI, JACKSON, CORREA, PADGETT & HANSEN, supra note 26. For a brief
summary of some of the results published here see generally Michael Heise & Jason P. Nance,
Following Data: The “Defund the Police” Movement’s Implications for Elementary and
Secondary Schools, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY ONLINE 63 (2020).
128
Various results discussed in this Article also derive from the restricted-use version of
the 2009–2010 SSOCS data series. SSOCS data sets dominate the empirical literature seeking
to assess schools’ SRO/police presence influence on student referrals to law enforcement
agencies. See, e.g., supra note 6.
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agencies as well as the number of full- and part-time SRO/police officers at
each school.129
To construct its sample, drawn from the universe of American public K12 schools, the National Center for Education Statistics (“NCES”) used the
2013–2014 school year Common Core of Data Public Elementary/Secondary
School Universe File (“CCD”)130 to help ensure that the weighted SSOCS
data set reflects a representative sample of American public K-12 schools.131
Insofar as this study seeks information on “typical” or “regular” schools,
those schools classified as something other than “regular” were excluded
from analyses.132 Moreover, additional school-level data from the CCD were
also used to develop various “framing” variables included in the SSOCS data
set. The 2015–2016 SSOCS data set is the most recent in a periodic series

129

Institute of Education Science, Data Security Office, User License No.19110005. The
public version of the SSOCS data set and codebook are available at 2015-2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS) Public-Use Data Files and Codebook, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018109 [https://perma.cc/ZW5VAKRS] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021). The restricted-use version of the 2015–2016 SSOCS data
set includes a greater level of detail in the data compared to public-use data files. See generally
Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp [https://perma.cc/W7JE-WEEU] (last
visited Mar. 5, 2021). Importantly, to align our study with previous studies our focus on
SRO/police includes only school resource officers and other sworn law enforcement officials.
Our focus on sworn law officials, therefore, excludes any security guards or other individual
who may contribute to school safety but who are neither a sworn nor formally trained law
enforcement official.
130
The Common Core of Data (CCD) “is an NCES annual census system that collects
fiscal and non-fiscal data on all public schools, public school districts, and state education
agencies in the United States.” NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., 2015–16
SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE USER’S
MANUAL 8 (2017) [hereinafter CODEBOOK] (on file with author). For additional descriptions
of the CCD see Nance, supra note 3, 959–60 (describing the CCD); Helen M. Marks & Jason
P. Nance, Contexts of Accountability Under Systemic Reform: Implications for Principal
Influence on Instruction and Supervision, 43 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 3, 10–11 (2007) (same).
131
The total number of public schools sampled was 3,553; of those, 2,092 schools
submitted completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 62.9% (weighted sample;
58.9% (raw sample)). See CODEBOOK, supra note 130, at 1, 29; see also MICHAEL JACKSON,
MELISSA DILIBERTI, JANA KEMP, STEVEN HUMMELL, CHRISTINA COX, KOMBA GBONDOTUGBAWA, DILLON SIMON & RACHEL HANSEN, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF
EDUC., 2015–16 SCHOOL SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS); PUBLIC-USE DATA FILE
USER’S MANUAL 1 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2018107
[https://perma.cc/DND6-2Y6Q].
132
Among the 2,090 schools in the SSOCS data set, 1,890 (or 90.4%) were identified as
a “regular public school” (as opposed to public charter or magnet schools) and serve as the
focus of this study. This Article’s focus on “regular” public schools is consistent with parallel
empirical work, particularly in the school finance literature. See IVY MORGAN & ARY
AMERIKANER, THE EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2018: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3 (2018).
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that began in the 1999–2000 school year.133 Finally, to facilitate inferences
to the broader universe of “regular” public schools, the approximately 1,890
schools used in the analyses were weighted to generate population-level
estimates.134
Unlike past studies that use earlier versions of the SSOCS data set, our
study supplements the SSOCS data set in two important ways that potentially
inform the likelihood of a school reporting an incident to law enforcement
agencies. First, we supplement the school-level SSOCS information with
state-level information on what circumstances—and for what particular
student offenses or incidents—do federal or state laws compel a school to
report an incident to law enforcement agencies.135 Federal law, for example,
mandates that all local education agencies (i.e., school districts) receiving
federal education funding pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (which includes virtually every “regular” public K-12 school)
create and implement a policy “requiring referral to the criminal justice or
juvenile delinquency system of any student who brings a firearm or weapon
to a school . . . .”136 Such statutes eliminate (or severely reduce) schools’
discretion insofar as the statutes require them to report certain activities that
occur on school property to law enforcement authorities regardless of
surrounding or mitigating circumstances. At the same time, many state
statutes go beyond federally imposed requirements and mandate that schools
also refer to law enforcement agencies a range of student incidents and
offenses that do not involve a firearm or weapon.137
The second way we supplement the SSOCS data set involves the
inclusion of school district-level data on current per pupil spending. We
settled on current expenditures, partly as it facilitates comparisons of student
investment across the widest array of studies in the school finance

133
Prior SSOCS data sets were collected in the 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2005–2006,
2007–2008 and 2009–2010 school years. CODEBOOK, supra note 130, at 1. While not publiclyavailable during the execution of this study, the Department of Education recently made
available the 2017–2018 version of the SSOCS data set.
134
Data in most of our analyses used the final analysis weight (“FINALWGT”) variable.
Such sample weighting is necessary to “obtain population-based estimates, to minimize bias
arising from differences between responding and nonresponding schools, and to calibrate the
data to known population characteristics in a way that reduces sampling error.” CODEBOOK,
supra note 130, at 20.
135
In this way our current study more helpfully aligns with Nance’s prior study of 2009–
2010 SSOCS data. See Nance, supra, note 3, at 934–36.
136
20 U.S.C. § 7151(h)(1); see also FLA. STAT. § 1006.07(l) (2014) (mandating that any
student who brings a firearm or weapon to any school function will be expelled for a period
not less than a year and “referred to the criminal justice or juvenile justice system”).
137
See supra Part I.A.1.
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literature.138 To do so, we matched district-level spending data from the 2016
U.S. Census Bureau’s publicly-available annual survey of public elementary
and secondary schools onto the SSOCS data set.139 As well, the school
district-level current per pupil spending data were adjusted for cost-of-living
variation across the more than 13,000 public school districts with data from
the Comparable Wage Index.140
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

This Article’s main analytic focus dwells on the possible relation
between the presence—as well as magnitude—of SRO/police at a school and
that school’s rate of reporting student disciplinary incidents to law
enforcement agencies. To this end, schools reported the total recorded
number of student disciplinary incidents that took place at their school during
the 2015–2016 school year as well as the subset of those incidents that
resulted in school referrals to law enforcement agencies. The student
discipline incident types that triggered school referrals to law enforcement
agencies ranged from rapes and robberies with a weapon to the distribution,
possession, or use of prescription drugs and alcohol as well as student
“vandalism.”141
The various student discipline incidents that prompted school reports to
law enforcement agencies contributed to the creation of three separate
dependent variables of interest. First, a dummy variable signals whether a
school made at least one report to a law enforcement agency about a student
incident at school during the 2015–2016 school year. Second, a continuous
138
See Michael Heise, Per Pupil Spending and Poverty’s Persistent Penalty: An
Empirical Analysis of 2016 District-Level NCES Data, 45 J. EDUC. FIN. 149, 154–57 (2019)
(comparing leading per pupil spending measures).
139
2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/econ/school-finances/secondary-education-finance.
html [https://perma.cc/DMP5-V5WR] (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
140
For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index see
generally LORI L. TAYLOR & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STAT., A COMPARABLE WAGE APPROACH TO GEOGRAPHIC COST ADJUSTMENT (2006),
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006321.pdf [https://perma.cc/AAK8-SX3D]. For a discussion
of some of the limitations of the CWI adjustment, see Heise, supra note 138, at 154–55 n.20;
Thomas A. DeLuca, Instructional Spending Metrics: A Multilevel Analysis Using NCES Data,
44 J. EDUC. FIN. 23, 42 (2018).
141
The SSOCS data derive from school administrators’ reports on, for example, “recorded
student incidents.” As such, while instructions describing how such variables were intended
to be operationalized were included with the surveys to promote consistency across schools,
to some unknown degree these data inevitably reflect school administrators’ interpretations of
what constitutes a “student incident” warranting “recording.” See CODEBOOK, supra note 130,
at 41.
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variable captures a school’s rate (per 100 students) of student incident reports
to law enforcement agencies. Finally, insofar as the types of incidents that
schools reported to law enforcement include both violent (e.g., rape and
armed robbery) as well as non-violent (e.g., vandalism and possession of
alcohol) incidents, we felt that the subset of non-violent incidents warranted
close inspection. This is especially true to the extent that some schools may
have been systematically less inclined to report non-violent student incidents
to law enforcement agencies. To this end we constructed a third dependent
variable designed to capture a school’s rate (per 100 students) of student
incident reports to law enforcement agencies for the subset of non-violent
student incidents. Our decision to transform raw school report counts into
school report rates (per 100 students) seeks to account for variation in school
size or scale (expressed in terms of student enrollment) across the sampled
schools.142
A descriptive summary of our dependent variables, presented in Table
1, illustrates that almost one-half (49%) of the schools in our weighted
sample reported at least one student incident to law enforcement agencies
during the 2015–2016 school year. The mean rate of school reports to law
enforcement agencies is just under one (0.77) per 100 students.143 The mean
rate of school reports involving non-violent student incidents is well under
one-half (0.33) per 100 students.144
C. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Insofar as our analytical focus dwells on the possible relation between
a school’s rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies
and the presence—and magnitude—of law enforcement officials at the
school, our key independent variables of interest relate to a school’s
SRO/police presence. Specifically, we focus not only on whether a school

142
Unreported alternative specifications exploring schools’ rates of student disciplinary
incident reports to police use the square root of the rate as its distribution is less distorted by
schools that reported no such incidents. Results from these unreported analyses do not
materially differ from our results that derive from non-transformed rates. See infra tbl.4.
143
As the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600 students (595.4),
on average each school reported just over four (4.6) student incidents. Because only 49% of
schools reported any incidents, the effective mean number of incident reports to law
enforcement is approximately nine student incidents among those schools that reported any
incidents.
144
Similarly, as the mean student enrollment in our school sample is just under 600
students (595.4), on average each school reported just under two (1.98) non-violent incidents.
Because only 49% of schools reported any incidents, violent or non-violent, the effective mean
number of non-violent incident reports to law enforcement is approximately four non-violent
incidents among those schools that reported any incidents.
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has any full- or part-time SRO or sworn police officers present at least once
a week at their school but also how many.
Based on reports from school administrators we assessed this by
constructing two related but independent variables. One is a dummy variable
that signals those schools who reported the presence of either a full- or parttime SRO/police officer at their school at least once a week. Including this
dummy variable facilitates comparisons with prior scholarship using earlier
SSOCS data sets.145 As Table 1 illustrates, 50% of the regular schools in our
weighted sample reported at least one full- or part-time SRO/police officer
on site at least once a week during the 2015–2016 school year.
Many prior studies compare schools who reported the presence of either
a full- or part-time SRO/police officer present at the school at least once a
week with those schools that lack any SRO/police presence. Such studies,
while helpful, ignore how variation in the magnitude of a school’s
SRO/police presence across schools may itself inform the likelihood of a
school referring student incidents to law enforcement. That is, a greater
number of SRO/police at a school may itself exert upward influence on the
number of school reports to law enforcement agencies. To better explore this
possibility, we created a second independent variable assessing the total
number of SRO or sworn police officers at a school. Interestingly, as Table
1 illustrates, one-half of the sampled schools report any law enforcement
presence; the mean SRO/police presence is just under one (0.84) official per
school.146
In addition to its SRO/police presence, if any, a school’s likelihood of
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies is certainly also the
function of a complex interaction of other variables. The inclusion of such
variables is necessary to help control for various factors’ influence on
schools’ student incident reports to law enforcement agencies that are
independent of factors located at the focal point of this study—the presence
of SRO/police at a school. The various control variables we consider loosely
organize into two general categories: school- and student-level factors.

145
For a similar approach toward this key independent variable, see, e.g., Nance, supra
note 3, at 961–62 n.216. The SRO/police calculation excludes any security guards or other
individuals contributing to school safety who are not sworn law enforcement officers. See
supra note 129.
146
Insofar as only one-half of the schools in our sample report any SRO/law enforcement
officials present at least once a week, the effective number of law enforcement officials at
schools that report any is approximately 1.6 per school.
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D. CONTROL VARIABLES

1. School-Level Variables
Insofar as we seek to estimate models assessing the likelihood of a
school reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies, such factors
as a school’s base “disorder” level and student enrollment “turbulence”
within a school, a school’s urbanicity score, and an assessment of the general
crime level where the school is located are important as they likely inform
the school’s reporting rates. To measure a school’s base “disorder” level we
constructed a school disorder variable by indexing a school’s total number of
recorded student disciplinary incidents (per 100 students).147 A school’s
student enrollment turbulence measure is the percentage of the school’s
students who either transferred into or out of the school during the 2015–
2016 school year. As well, school “urbaniticity,” based on the school’s
geographic location, is measured on a four-point scale, ranging from “rural”
to “urban.” Finally, a three-point scale assessing a school’s general crime
level measure derives from school administrators’ perceptions of general
crime levels in the geographic area in which their school is located.
While many key variables already account for variation in student
enrollment across schools, we include a school’s raw student enrollment as a
separate independent variable to help capture whether a school’s scale exerts
any influence on its student discipline reporting behaviors. For similar—
though distinct—reasons, we also include a variable measuring each school’s
student-to-teacher ratio. To the extent that smaller schools or schools
benefitting from a higher percentage of adults, specifically, teachers, are
more likely to facilitate the emergence of a comparatively healthier school
“climate” or “culture,” we hypothesize that school reporting to law
enforcement agencies is more likely in larger and potentially more
impersonal schools.
Along with student enrollment, student-to-teacher ratios, school
disruption, and enrollment turbulence, another factor plausibly contributing
to a school’s overall climate and culture involves a school’s fiscal strength.
For this we turn to a standard proxy, annual (2015–2016) current per pupil
spending. We do so because we wonder whether variation in the distribution
of student investment across schools might contribute to variation in schools’
rate of reporting student incidents to law enforcement authorities. And even
A school’s total “recorded” student disciplinary incidents forms the universe from
which the subset of student disciplinary incidents that the school “reported” to law
enforcement agencies derives. That is, while every school report to law enforcement agencies
involved, by definition, a recorded student disciplinary incident, not every recorded student
disciplinary incident culminated in a school report to a law enforcement agency.
147
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if such a relation or its direction are not obvious, school fiscal data may
capture other unobservable aspects of a school or its culture that warrant
controlling for.
To do so, and to extend existing research, we exploit the leading source
of school district-level per pupil spending data: U.S. Census Bureau’s annual
survey of public elementary and secondary schools for financial
information148 supplemented by the U.S. Department of Education’s
National Center for Education Statistics Comparable Wage Index. The
supplemental data adjust for cost-of-living variation across the nations more
than 13,000 public school districts.149 We settled on current expenditures
partly because it facilitates comparisons of student investment across the
widest array of studies in the school finance literature.150 As Table 1 makes
clear, across all the schools in our sample, mean current per pupil spending
exceeded $11,000 for the sampled schools in 2015–2016.
Slightly complicating our decision to include per pupil spending data is
that our data include school district-level means. The total (raw) number of
schools in our sample (1,890) derives from 1,490 different school districts.
Thus, 400 schools in our sample come from a district that includes at least
one or more other schools in the sample. For those schools that share a school
district, their district-level current per pupil spending value does not vary.
While admittedly not ideal, to the extent that attention to per pupil spending
discrepancies typically focuses on variation across—rather than within—
school districts, the district-level per pupil spending data should not unduly
distort our results.151 Finally, what little empirical evidence exists suggests
that, when it comes to within district school spending variations, in many
instances schools serving higher concentrations of minority students or
students from low-income households can receive more in terms of per pupil
spending than schools serving a smaller percentage of minority students or
those from low-income households or both.152
148

See 2016 Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, supra note 139.
For a detailed description and explanation of the Comparable Wage Index see
generally TAYLOR & FOWLER, supra note 140. For a discussion of some of the limitations of
the CWI adjustment see DeLuca, supra note 140, at 42.
150
For a discussion of the various leading per pupil spending measures, see Heise, supra
note 138, at 154–57 (comparing leading per pupil spending measures).
151
But see Ary Amerikaner, The Hidden Inequality in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, January 30,
2020, at A31 (noting that in some school districts consequential per pupil spending variation
exists across schools).
152
See generally Simon Ejdemyr and Kenneth A. Shores, Pulling Back the Curtain: IntraDistrict School Spending Inequality and its Correlates, (July 31, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3009775 [https://perma.cc/
149

2021]

"DEFUND THE (SCHOOL) POLICE"?

749

Insofar as mandatory school reporting obligations for various student
incidents bear, by design, squarely on our dependent variables of interest, our
models also control for whether schools were statutorily obligated to report
various incident types to law enforcement agencies under prevailing state
law.153 To accomplish this we drew from the relevant statutes and regulations
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Where a clear and relatively
unambiguous mandatory reporting obligation existed, our dummy variable is
coded as “1.” To focus our analyses of the sub-pool of non-violent student
discipline incidents we include two separate mandatory reporting variables:
one for violent student incidents; the other for non-violent incidents.
Finally, even though the majority of public schools in the United States
are elementary schools and, as Table 1 illustrates, our sample reflects this
(59% of the sampled schools are elementary schools), most school crime and
violence occurs in middle and high schools. Despite the skewed distribution
of school crime and violence across school levels, we remain mindful that
the Sandy Hook (CT) Elementary School tragedy in December 2012
unfolded only a few years prior to the data gathering efforts that culminated
in the 2015–2016 SSOCS data set. Consequently, we approached this study
with a heightened curiosity about how elementary schools might
systematically differ from middle and high schools in terms of their proclivity
to report student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies. To
explore this, we include in our models a dummy variable coded for “1” for
elementary schools.154 Insofar as the reference group for interpreting the
elementary school dummy variable includes all “non-elementary” schools,155
what we expect to find is that elementary schools report systematically fewer
school incidents reports to law enforcement and a comparatively smaller
SRO/police presence. Despite our own “priors” about elementary schools,
violence, and school reporting, what we found is a larger number of student
incidents as well as more SRO/police assigned to elementary schools than
we initially expected.156 Finally, as school-to-prison pipeline hypotheses
R4ZT-WHQB] (observing that schools serving higher need students often noted for
comparatively greater per pupil spending levels).
153
Our focus on state-specific mandatory reporting statutes implicitly acknowledges that
application of relevant federal reporting requirements, by definition, should not have varied
across the schools in our sample. State-level mandatory reporting requirements, by contrast,
did vary.
154
For purposes of this study, a school facility was coded as an “elementary” school if the
highest grade level present in the school facility was at (or below) the eighth grade or lower
and if the lowest grade level present was at (or below) the third grade.
155
And this reference group includes all middle and high schools, as well as schools that
combine middle and high school grades.
156
See infra tbl.6.
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likely cut in anomalous and unexpected ways in the elementary school
context, we focus on the elementary school context in supplemental
analyses.157
2. Student-Focused Variables
In addition to the variables summarized above, key student-focused
factors, especially those factors reflecting possible student marginalization,
likely influence a school’s rate of student incident reporting to law
enforcement agencies.158 Factors aligning with various student
marginalization theses and inserted into in our models include a school’s
percentage of all nonwhite (including Black) and Black students as well as
the percentage of students from low-income households.159 Moreover, as
boys are more likely than girls to trigger school discipline matters, we also
control for a school’s percentage of male students.160 Table 1 presents basic
summary statistics on all the variables considered in our various models.

157

See infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., DAVID CANTOR & MAREENA MCKINLEY WRIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
SCHOOL CRIME PATTERNS: A NATIONAL PROFILE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS USING RATES
OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE 8 (2002), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/studiesschool-violence/school-crime-pattern.pdf [https://perma.cc/92YW-GGWQ] (finding that
large high schools located in urban areas serving a high percentage of minority students tend
to experience more school crime); TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 20 (observing that
crime is more common in schools that serve students from disadvantaged backgrounds). See
generally Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, Race, Poverty, and Exclusionary School Security:
An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, 12 YOUTH VIOLENCE
& JUV. JUST. 332 (2014) (finding that exclusionary student security measures are more
common in comparatively more non-white schools).
159
The students from low-income household variable is construed to include those
students eligible to participate in a free- or reduced-lunch program. For a general discussion
of various student poverty measures, see Heise, supra note 138, at 158.
160
For example, compare Skiba, Michael, Nardo & Peterson, supra note 19, at 320 (“In
virtually every study presenting school disciplinary data by gender, boys are referred to the
office and receive a range of disciplinary consequences at a significantly higher rate than
girls.”) and Wallace Jr., Goodkind, Wallace & Bachman, supra note 19, at 54 (“Within racial
and ethnic subgroups, boys are consistently more likely than girls of the same racial or ethnic
group to have experienced school discipline.”), with Nance, supra note 3, at 972–73 (reporting
“mixed” results as it relates to the influence of various student background characteristics of
school incident reports to law enforcement).
158
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Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Dep. vars:
School reported one or more incident to police (1=yes)
0.49
0.50
Rate of school police reports (per 100 students) [all]
0.77
1.92
Rate of school police reports (per 100 students) [non-violent]
0.33
0.79
Ind. vars:
Was a full- or part-time SRO/police at school (1=yes)
0.50
0.50
Number of full- and part-time SRO/police at school
0.84
2.44
School student:teacher ratio
17.79
23.58
School student mobility % (in/out)
15.05
14.02
School urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4)
2.51
1.14
School disorder report rate (per 100 students)
1.57
3.10
School area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3)
1.31
0.58
School student enrollment
595.4
413.9
Elementary school (1=yes)
0.59
0.49
Mand. school violent incident report req. (1=yes)
0.90
0.30
Mand. school non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
0.69
0.46
School student poverty %
56.15
27.29
School student nonwhite %
43.1
32.92
School student Black %
12.46
20.91
School student male %
49.7
9.1
School district mean per pupil spending (2016 $s)
11,196
5,153
NOTES: Reported means and standard deviations derive from the SSOCS weighted
sample; N (raw)=1,890.
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).
E. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

We test our various research hypotheses with three different, though
related, empirical specifications. One general question (and one pursued in
prior research161) involves whether the presence of any SRO/police at a
school influences the likelihood of that school referring student discipline
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To explore this question, we estimate
logistic regression models of whether a school referred any student incidents
to law enforcement agencies and include a dummy variable signaling
whether the school had any SRO/police present at school at least one day per
week.
A separate—though related—research question considers whether the
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence influences a school’s
161

See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969 tbl.2 (analyzing 2009–2010 SSOCS data).
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propensity to report student discipline incidents to law enforcement agencies.
Our approach to this question exploits potentially systematic variation
supplied by more granular information included in our key variables of
interest—the rate of a school’s reports to law enforcement agencies and the
number of SRO/police officials present at each school. To do so, we estimate
fractional response regression models of a continuous variable—the rate of
school incident reports to law enforcement—bounded between zero and
one.162
Finally, we pursue a third question with a selection strategy. The subpool of student disciplinary incidents that triggered school referrals to law
enforcement agencies derives from the broader universe of total student
disciplinary incidents “recorded” at a school.163 One key across-school
variation of interest involves whether, for any given student disciplinary
incident recorded at a school, a school referral to a law enforcement agency
ensued. Approximately 20% of the schools in our sample, however, did not
experience any recorded student disciplinary incidents and, by definition, had
nothing to consider in terms of reporting to law enforcement agencies.
Moreover, our instinct is that the distribution of total student disciplinary
incidents across schools is unlikely random and our data permit us to
structure a two-stage inquiry that exploits this distribution. To pursue this,
we estimate a two-stage Heckman selection model. In stage one we model
whether a school experienced a student disciplinary “incident” (one or more);
stage two then models the rate of a school’s reports (or non-reports) to law
enforcement agencies, conditioned on the school having experienced at least
one incident.
F. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY LIMITATIONS

Despite the SSOCS data set’s obvious merits, it is not without
limitations. For example, while data exist on a variety of school- and studentlevel measures, including a school’s gender and racial/ethnic profiles, the
data set does not include gender or racial information on the actual students
162

Insofar as our dependent variable is a rate (or fraction) bounded between zero and one
(inclusive), we preferenced fractional response regression models. Owing to the possibility of
overdispersion, and in an abundance of caution, we also considered two alternative
specifications in an effort to ensure that our core results were robust to model specification.
Unreported results from a binominal regression model as well as a negative binominal
regression model using actual raw school-level count data do not materially differ from results
presented in tbl.2, infra. For examples of a similar empirical strategy, see, e.g., Daniel Hamlin
& Angran Li, The Relationship Between Parent Volunteering in School and School Safety in
Disadvantaged Urban Neighborhoods, 19 J. SCH. VIOLENCE 362, 367 (2020) (presenting
results from negative binominal regression models).
163
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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involved in the disciplinary incidents that triggered school reports to law
enforcement agencies. The absence of such information, of course,
functionally precludes precise inferences about whether schools’ student
incident reporting practices distributed in ways that skew at the individuallevel against, for example, boys, racial/ethnic minorities, or students from
low-income households.
Similarly, given the absence of particularized and follow-up data on
those students who engaged in incidents that motivated school reports to law
enforcement agencies, we cannot know what actually happened to those
students reported. As difficult as it might be to imagine that all such students
were arrested and convicted, it is equally difficult to imagine that none of
them were. Moreover, the SSOCS data set similarly precludes analyses of
how the array of possible outcomes—arrest, conviction, or release without
arrest—distributed across those students referred to law enforcement
agencies by their schools.
Of course, the absence of more particularized data on the law
enforcement agency referrals’ outcomes, however, does little to deflect from
the larger point that any student referral to a law enforcement agency is
plausibly important and, to some extent, likely changes that student’s future
for the worse. Regardless of any formal legal consequences, a school’s
referral to law enforcement can also culminate with student discipline,
suspensions, or expulsions in the school context.164
In terms of our overall empirical strategy, we remain mindful that
research design limitations preclude our findings from supporting any strong
causal claims. In a more perfect world, we would (for example) randomly
assign SRO/police to otherwise identical schools (as it relates to our various
dependent variables of interest) to assess possible causal relations between a
school’s rate of reporting student discipline incidents to law enforcement
agencies and the magnitude of law enforcement officials at the schools. Our
lack of control over randomization precludes us from assessing casual
direction with precision. For example, the number of SRO/police at a school
may be a product of pre-existing student disruption, crime levels, or student
disciplinary incidents. Similarly, it is also plausible that the presence of
SRO/police at the school itself may inform a school’s rate of incident
reporting to law enforcement agencies.
As a “second best” empirical strategy, we are limited to exploiting a rich
array of control variables designed to help disentangle the complex relations

164

See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 2014) (observing
how schools’ student disciplinary referrals to law enforcement contribute to a “school-toprison pipeline”).
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between and among our dependent and key independent variables of interest.
For example, as it specifically relates to our hypotheses on a relation between
SRO/police at a school and that school’s student incident reporting to law
enforcement agencies, our models seek to control for other likely factors that
bear on a school’s likelihood of reporting incidents to law enforcement.
While these important data and research design factors preclude strong causal
claims, we feel that our results are positioned to contribute to the existing
knowledge base on school crime and safety.165
As Table 1 reveals that one-half of the sampled schools did not have
any SRO/police presence, Table 2 provides a glimpse into how schools with
an SRO/police presence (one or more) compare with schools that did not
have any. In general, schools with an SRO/police presence reported slightly
high school disorder rates, larger student enrollments, and spent a bit less per
pupil than schools without an SRO/police presence. Table 2 also makes clear
that an SRO/police presence was less common in elementary schools.

165

As well, the data and empirical strategy factors that limit the force of the claims in this
study are similar to limitations that attach to prior studies on this topic. See, e.g., Nance, supra
note 3, at 971.
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Table 2: Comparing School Means With and Without Any SRO/Police
Presence
With
Without
Ind. vars:
School student:teacher ratio
17.14
18.44
School student mobility % (in/out)
15.62
14.48
School urbanicity scale (rural-to-urban; 1-4)
2.53
2.49
School disorder report rate (per 100 students)
1.91
1.23
School area crime scale (low-to-high; 1-3)
1.31
1.31
School student enrollment
714.52 476.29
Elementary school (1=yes)
0.45
0.74
Mandatory school violent incident report req. (1=yes)
0.88
0.92
Mandatory school non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
0.66
0.71
School student poverty %
55.65
56.65
School student nonwhite %
42.81
43.38
School student Black %
13.35
11.56
School student male %
49.54
49.86
School district mean per pupil spending (2016 $s)
10,885 11,509
N (raw)
1,270
620
NOTES: Reported means derive from the SSOCS weighted sample.
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our initial logistic regression models more closely hew to prior
scholarship, and results from these models facilitate comparisons to earlier
studies. In alternative, though complementary, analyses we estimate
fractional regression models appropriate for a more granular dependent
variable expressed as a school’s rate of reporting student discipline incidents
to law enforcement agencies. An additional set of analyses considers—and
endeavors to adjust for—the possible influence of selection effects. Finally,
insofar as elementary schools may behave systematically differently in the
student discipline context, we repeat our core analyses on elementary
schools.
A. LOGISTIC AND FRACTIONAL REGRESSION MODELS

We begin our analyses at a general level to facilitate comparisons with
prior scholarly work using earlier SSOCS data sets. Specifically, we initially
consider whether any SRO/police presence (no matter how large or small) at
a school influences the likelihood of that school referring student disciplinary
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To assess this question, we estimate
logistic models of whether a school referred any student incidents to law
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enforcement agencies and include a dummy variable signaling whether a
school had any SRO/police presence.
Results presented in Table 3 provide some level of clarity as well as
introduce a potentially informative—if complicating—wrinkle. As our naïve
model (Model 1) makes clear, any SRO/police presence at a school
corresponds with an increased likelihood of that school reporting one (or
more) student incidents to law enforcement agencies. While the addition of
our suite of control variables into the right-hand side of our equation (Model
2) dampens the statistical influence attributable to a school’s SRO/police
presence, this variable nonetheless persists as statistically important. At the
same time, other control variables also emerge as important and most do so
in the expected directions. In particular, schools that are comparatively
larger, more urban, and that report higher student “disorder” rates
systematically increase the odds of the school referring student incidents to
law enforcement agencies. Elementary schools, by contrast, were
comparatively less likely to report.166
Model 3 explores an analogous—though distinct—question. Where
models 1 and 2 explore the influence of any SRO/police presence on a
school’s likelihood of reporting student incidents to law enforcement
agencies, model 3 considers whether variation in the size of a school’s
SRO/police presence matters. And the (null) result in model 3 implies—in
conjunction with results from models 1 and 2—that when it comes to
increasing the likelihood of a school referring one or more student incidents
to law enforcement agencies, what matters was whether a school had an
SRO/police presence rather than the size of that presence. Moreover, results
in models 2 and 3 are notable for key control variables’ robustness,
specifically variables relating to schools’ size and student disorder rates.
Finally, our findings in Table 3 generally comport with prior scholarship that
analyzes earlier SSOCS data sets.167
Results in Table 3 also introduce a second general theme that persists
across our analyses: an overall paucity of statistically significant findings for
an array of school-level variables plausibly germane to distributional
concerns deriving from schools’ engagement with law enforcement agencies.
It remains important to keep in mind that data limitations preclude analyses
of how schools’ law enforcement referral practices distribute across various

166

As elementary schools may be somewhat anomalous for an array of reasons, we
explore them further in separate analyses. See infra Part III.C.
167
See, e.g., Nance, supra note 3, at 969 (reporting similar overall findings analyzing
2009–2010 SSOCS data).
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individual-level student sub-groups, particularly the comparatively more
vulnerable student sub-groups.168
Our findings do shed light—if incomplete—on how law enforcement
agency referrals distribute across schools with various student sub-group
compositions. Notably, as Table 3 illustrates, a school’s percentage of
students in poverty, Black students, nonwhite students, and male students do
not correspond with any systematic increase in that school’s likelihood of
reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies. Similarly, variation
in district-level mean per pupil spending does not achieve statistical
significance. While we are mindful that null results are quite limited in what
they can appropriately bear analytically, in this context, the absence of
statistical evidence of problematic school-level distributional factors caught
our attention. Enhancing our surprise with these null findings is their
juxtaposition with the often strong and persistent distributional concerns
found in the existing literature.169
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, we note the uneven results for the
state-level mandatory reporting requirement variables in Table 3. What the
results imply is that the presence of mandatory reporting requirements for
non-violent student incidents corresponds with a reduction in the odds that a
school reported a student disciplinary incident to a law enforcement agency.
At the risk of trying to explain the inexplicable, we note that both state
mandatory reporting requirement variables do not vary all that much across
the states. In addition, along with various state and federal reporting
requirements, many schools and their districts have their own policies,
practices, or norms relating to student disciplinary referrals.170 These risk
168

The SSOCS data set does not include individualize information of the actual students
whose conduct triggered a law enforcement referral.
169
See, e.g., Na & Gottfredson, supra note 3, at 623; Torres & Stefkovich, supra note 3,
at 463. Our results generally comport with F. Chris Curran and his colleagues’ findings from
observing the effects of SRO programs on students, including the frequency of student arrests,
in two mid-sized suburban school districts in the South. See supra notes 69–73 and
accompanying text (“SROs tended to view the risk of threats and their approaches to school
discipline similarly, regardless of the racial composition of the school.”). However, an
importance difference between our study and their study is that we examined schools’
likelihood of reporting student incidents to law enforcement agencies, whereas they examined
SROs’ approach to student discipline, including student arrests. See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO
& KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 31–32. Our results also somewhat parallel results from a small
handful of empirical studies of exclusionary school discipline. Specifically, some studies show
that Black students are not subject to exclusionary discipline at higher rates for more serious
and objectively defined offenses, especially when discipline is mandated. See supra notes 58–
59 and accompanying text; see also Heise & Nance, supra note 18, at 24–28.
170
See, e.g., CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHS., STUDENTS RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2019-20, at
11 (2019); HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., 2019-2020 CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 12, 13, 16 (2019).
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injecting some level of imprecision into our mandatory reporting requirement
variables.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Models of Whether a School Reported a
Student Discipline Incident to a Law Enforcement Agency
Full- or pt.-time SRO/police (1=yes)
Num. of full- and pt.-time
SRO/police at school
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Elementary school (1=yes)
Violent incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School Black %
School male %
School district mean per pupil spending
Constant
Pseudo R2
N (raw)

(1)
2.85**

0.56**
0.05
1,890

(0.37)

(0.05)

(2)
1.51*
---

(0.25)

(3)
--1.06

(0.05)

1.00
1.00
1.18*
1.26**
1.37
1.00**
0.17**
0.78
0.68*
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98
1.00

(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.26)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.22)
(0.13)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

1.00
1.00
1.18
1.26**
1.35
1.00**
0.16**
0.74
0.69*
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98
1.00

(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.25)
(0.00)
(0.03)
(0.21)
(0.13)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

1.12
0.27
1,890

(0.72)

1.14
0.27
1,890

(0.89)

NOTES: Whether a school reported a student disciplinary incident to law
enforcement agencies (1=yes). Robust standard errors, clustered on school district,
in parentheses. The models were estimated using the “logistic” command in Stata
(v.16.1) and used SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).

While results from our logistic regression specifications (reported in
Table 3) are necessary to help tether our study to prior leading scholarship
using earlier SSOCS data sets, such specifications do not fully exploit helpful
additional variation contained in the data set. To explore further, we
considered how variation in the number of SRO/police officials present at
each school informed the school’s rate of reporting student discipline
incidents to law enforcement agencies. To do so, we estimate fractional
response regression models (Table 4) of a continuous rate (or fractional)
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variable—specifically, the rate of school incident reports to law enforcement
agencies. In this way we can better assess whether variation in a school’s
SRO/police presence size corresponds with variation in school reporting
rates.
Comparing results presented in Tables 3 and 4 reveals how key findings
generally persist across different models and empirical approaches as well as
comport with the weight of existing empirical research. Specifically, an
increase in the size of a school’s SRO/police presence consistently and
strongly correlates with an increase in a school’s rate of law enforcement
agency referrals. And this result emerges for all student disciplinary incidents
(model 1) as well as for the subset of non-violent incidents (model 2). While
we introduce separate analyses for non-violent student incidents on the
theory that schools may be more comfortable with handling such incidents
“in-house” and perhaps have a history of doing so, when it comes to law
enforcement reporting results, Table 4 suggests that schools appear to have
treated violent and non-violent student discipline incidents similarly.
Also similar to Table 3 is that none of the results in Table 4, with one
exception, provide support for distributional concerns. The one exception is
that an increase in a school’s percentage of students in poverty corresponds
with an increased rate of reports to law enforcement agencies for non-violent
student incidents (model 2).
The influences of a school’s disorder rate, student enrollment, and
enrollment stability (or student mobility) also persisted across our different
empirical approaches. Another enduring influence is that elementary schools
correspond with a reduced likelihood of school reporting to law enforcement
agencies. In all but one instance the mandatory reporting requirement
variables do not emerge as significant influences on schools’ reporting
behavior. Moreover, in the one instance (model 2) where state reporting
requirements for non-violent student conduct achieves statistical
significance, it corresponds with a decreased likelihood of school reports of
non-violent student incidents, thereby contributing further confusion about
the influence of mandatory reporting requirements.
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Table 4: Fractional Response Regression Models of School Report Rates for
All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law Enforcement
Agencies
(1)

Ttl. SRO/police at school
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Elementary school (1=yes)
Vio. incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-vio incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School Black %
School male %
School district mean per pupil spending

All Incidents
1.03**
(0.01)
0.99
(0.01)
1.02*
(0.01)
0.93
(0.07)
1.06**
(0.02)
1.07
(0.12)
1.00**
(0.00)
0.29**
(0.08)
0.59
(0.19)
0.85
(0.11)
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
1.00
(0.00)
0.98
(0.01)
1.00
(0.00)

(2)
Non-violent
Incidents
1.02**
1.00
1.01*
0.97
1.03**
1.21*
1.00**
0.11**
1.04
0.70**
1.00*
1.00
0.99
1.00
1.00

(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.11)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)

Constant
0.04
(0.03)
0.00**
(0.00)
Pseudo R2
0.08
0.09
N (raw)
1,890
1,890
NOTES: The dependent variables include the rate of school reports for all student
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and the rate of school reports for
only non-violent student incidents to law enforcement agencies. Robust standard
errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using
the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used the odds ratio option and
SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).
B. THE SPECTER OF SCHOOL SELECTIONS

A school’s referral of a student disciplinary incident to a law
enforcement agency requires, by definition, the existence of a recorded
student “incident.” Approximately 20% of the schools in our weighted
sample, however, did not experience any recorded student “incidents” during
the 2015-16 school year and, thus, did not even have to consider whether any
particular student discipline incident rose to the level of warranting a report
to a law enforcement agency. What this means is that the 51.5% of schools
that reported no incidents to law enforcement agencies includes a
consequential number of schools (20.2%) that did not experience any
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recorded student disciplinary incidents. While both sets of schools report a
referral rate of zero (0.0) in our data set, such a referral rate from schools that
experienced no recorded student disciplinary incidents meaningfully differs
from the same reported rate (zero) from schools that experienced recorded
student incidents and yet, for whatever reason or reasons, affirmatively
declined to refer any of the recorded student discipline incidents to law
enforcement agencies.
In addition, our collective instinct is that the 20.2% of the schools in our
sample that did not experience any recorded student disciplinary incidents
likely systematically varies from schools that did. Consequently, such factors
introduce the potential influence of selection bias. To explore this possibility,
we turned to a two-stage Heckman model to better account for possible
selection effects. In stage one we model whether a school experienced any
recorded student disciplinary incident (one or more); stage two then models
a school’s rate of reports to law enforcement agencies, conditioned on the
school having experienced at least one recorded student discipline incident.
When conditioned on having experienced at least one recorded student
disciplinary incident, results from the top panel in Table 5 (the second-stage)
generally comport with prior results (Tales 3 and 4) for our key variables of
interest. When it comes to predicting variation in schools’ rates of law
enforcement agency referrals, what persists as important include the size of
a school’s SRO/police presence, its student disorder rate, and whether it is an
elementary school. Also consistent with our prior findings is that results in
Table 5 do not contribute to any distributional concerns.
Results in Table 5 also introduce a few new additional wrinkles. For
example, emerging as statistically important for the first time in Table 5 is
that a reduction in a school’s student:teacher ratio corresponds with an
increase in the school’s law enforcement agency referral rate. In addition,
and parallel to the student:teacher ratio finding, a focus only on non-violent
incidents (model 2) reveals that an increase in student enrollment correlates
with an increase in the rate of school referrals. Finally, similar to what we
find in Table 4, results in Table 5 illustrate that only non-violent student
incident mandatory reporting requirements achieve statistical significance
and correspond with a decrease in school referrals to law enforcement
agencies.
Our initial instinct that the subset of schools that experienced no
recorded student disciplinary incidents systematically differs from the much
larger subset of schools that experienced at least one student recorded
discipline incident—and that this filtering may distort models of schools’ law
enforcement agency reporting tendencies—does not find support in our
results, as the Rho test statistics do not achieve statistical significance. While
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a two-stage specification may not be necessarily required by our data set’s
underlying structure we remain, as of yet anyway, unprepared to entirely
dismiss the possible influence of selection effects, particularly as the Rho test
statistic is notoriously sensitive to model specification.171 If nothing else,
results in Table 5 provide yet another robustness check for our core results
and selection model specifications offer an alternative approach to our data
set’s underlying structure.
Overall, when it comes to either whether schools report student
disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and, if they do, at what
rate, we find consistent evidence—and across virtually all of our models—
on two general points. First, a school’s SRO/police presence exerts upward
influence on the school’s inclination to report student incidents to law
enforcement agencies. This finding persists even when we focus on nonviolent student disciplinary incidents. In addition to the importance of a
school’s SRO/police presence, other factors that also emerged as consistently
influential include a school’s disorder rate, enrollment factors, and whether
a school is an elementary school.
A second key finding involves what we do not find. While student-level
distributional concerns certainly remain a possibility (though outside of our
data set’s scope), our school-level findings, however, do not hint at any
obvious distributional concerns. That is, in virtually all of our analyses across
three separate analytical approaches, our results imply that increases in a
school’s percentage of Black, non-white, low-income, or male students do
not systematically correlate with increases in the school’s reporting rates to
law enforcement agencies.172

171
See Derek C. Briggs, Causal Inference and the Heckman Model, 29 J. EDUC. &
BEHAVIORAL STATS. 397, 399–400, 403–04 (2004) (noting the Rho test statistic’s sensitivity
to model selection); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State
Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUDIES 121, 146
(2009) (same).
172
The only exception involves a school’s percentage of low-income students in the nonviolent student incident context (tbl.4, model 2).
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Table 5: Selection Models of the Rate (per 100 students) of School Reports
of All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law Enforcement
Agencies and Total Recorded Student Discipline Incidents
(1)
All Incidents

(2)
Non-violent Incidents

0.04*
-0.00**
0.01
-0.06
0.24**
0.01
0.00
-0.67**
-0.38
-0.27*
-0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.02
-0.00
2.46*

0.02**
-0.00**
0.00
-0.02
0.04**
0.06
0.00**
-0.50**
0.10
-0.20**
0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.47**

Rate of school police reports (per 100 students)
Total SRO/police at sch.
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Elementary school (1=yes)
Violent incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School Black %
School male %
School dist. mean per pupil spending
Constant
Any student incident at school? (1=yes)

(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.00)
(0.19)
(0.38)
(0.12)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(1.01)

(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.16)

SRO/police at school (1=yes)
0.07
(0.18)
0.06
(0.18)
School student:teacher ratio
0.03
(0.02)
0.03*
(0.02)
School student mobility % (in/out)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
0.00
(0.10)
0.00
(0.10)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
83.72**
(14.27)
84.98**
(16.48)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
0.47*
(0.22)
0.47*
(0.22)
School student enrollment
0.00*
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
Elementary school (1=yes)
-0.94**
(0.20)
-0.88**
(0.22)
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes)
0.62
(0.39)
0.62
(0.39)
Non-violent. incident report req. (1=yes)
-0.29
(0.22)
-0.24
(0.23)
School poverty %
0.01
(0.00)
0.01
(0.00)
School nonwhite %
-0.01*
(0.00)
-0.01*
(0.00)
School Black %
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
School male %
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
School district mean per pupil spending
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
Constant
-1.33
(0.72)
-1.17
(0.74)
Rho
0.19
(0.20)
-0.14
(0.35)
N (raw)
1,890
1,890
NOTES: Model 1 explores all student disciplinary incidents; model 2 only non-violent
incidents. For both models, the first-stage models whether a school experienced any
recorded student disciplinary incidents. The second-stage models the rate (per 100
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students) of school reports of all and non-violent student incidents to law
enforcement agencies in models 1 and 2, respectively. Robust standard errors,
clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using the
“heckman” command in Stata (v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; **
p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).
C. THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL CONTEXT

Throughout our analyses we consistently find that the elementary school
setting corresponds with a reduced likelihood of school referrals to law
enforcement agencies. As the descriptive results in Table 6 illustrate,
elementary school law enforcement agency referral rates consistently lag
behind middle and high school rates. Moreover, this general finding persists
across at least two separate administrations of the SSOCS survey (2009–2010
and 2015–2016 school years). Indeed, if anything, Table 6 evidences a
decline in elementary school referrals between the 2009–2010 and 2015–
2016 school years.
At one level these descriptive findings are intuitive, expected, and,
frankly, refreshing. Given elementary school students’ tender years, at least
as compared to their middle- and high school counterparts, we expected (if
not hoped) to find that elementary schools were a less likely location for
recorded student disciplinary incidents that might culminate in law
enforcement agency referrals.173 Indeed, results in Table 6 support our
intuition and illustrate that the average number of recorded student
disciplinary incidents (the universe of student disciplinary matters from
which school administrators decide which student incidents warrant a referral
to law enforcement agencies) in elementary schools both declined over time
and in all instances lagged behind the average number of recorded student
incidents in middle and high schools. Thus, our prior findings evidencing
elementary schools’ comparatively lower student discipline referral rates
make sense insofar as this outcome may reflect the comparatively fewer (and,

173

We are mindful, of course, that arrests of young children sometimes do occur and,
when they do, often capture the attention of the nation and draw particular concern. See, e.g.,
Handcuffed 5-Year-Old Sparks Suit, CBS NEWS (Apr. 25, 2005, 9:40 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/handcuffed-5-year-old-sparks-suit/ [https://perma.cc/J6D9AJ7S]; Bob Herbert, 6-Year-Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/opinion/09herbert.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2ULYUPJH]; see also Jesselyn McCurdy, Targets for Arrest, in FROM EDUCATION TO
INCARCERATION: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 86, 90–93 (Anthony
Nocella, Priya Parmar & David Stovall eds., 2014).
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we presume, less severe) recorded student disciplinary incidents in
elementary schools. If so, whether this outcome is a consequence of an
SRO/police presence at elementary schools or a reduced base rate of adverse
student incidents, or some complex interaction of both factors, however,
remains unclear.
Table 6: Rates of School Reports of Student Disciplinary Incidents to Law
Enforcement Agencies Over Time (2009–2010/2015–2016)

Elementary Schools:
Total num. recorded student discip. incidents
School rptd. one or more incident to pol. (1=yes)
Rate of school police rpts. (per 100) [all]
Rate of school police rpts (per 100) [non-viol.]

2009-2010
Mean
N (raw)

2015-2016
Mean
N (raw)

12.75
0.44
0.35
0.19

8.92
0.30
0.35
0.08

630
630
630
630

470
470
470
470

Middle and High Schools:
Total num. recorded student discip. incidents
37.57
1,800
27.75
1,430
School rptd. one or more incident to pol. (1=yes)
0.85
1,800
0.76
1,430
Rate of school police rpts. (per 100) [all]
2.26
1,800
1.38
1,430
Rate of school police rpts (per 100) [non-viol.]
1.07
1,800
0.68
1,430
NOTES: Reported means derive from the SSOCS weighted data.
SOURCES: U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School
Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U. S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ.
Statistics, 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS-10).

Even though results in Table 6 suggest that threats to elementary school
safety likely declined between the 2009–2010 and 2015–2016 school years,
we remain mindful of the 2012 tragedy in Newton, CT, where semiautomatic gunfire in the Sandy Hook Elementary School claimed the lives of
26 individuals, including 20 six and seven year-old school children.174 Insofar
as such unfathomable tragedies can set into motion a series of expected and
unexpected legal and policy outcomes, how such a horrific event (and others)
may inform elementary school administrators going forward about initiating
or enhancing a SRO/police presence at their schools remains unclear.
On the one hand, we could easily envision elementary schools electing
to initiate or “beef-up” any pre-existing SRO/police presence if, perhaps, for
no other reason than to help “send a message” or demonstrate that they are

174

See, e.g., Sandy Hook Shooting: What Happened?, CNN (last visited Mar. 6, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/12/us/sandy-hook-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UUZ2-EDCZ] .
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“doing something” in terms of school safety.175 Such a gesture may help allay
public, parental, or schoolchildren’s concerns about safety and security at
their elementary schools.176 As well, to the extent that a general public safety
risk (real or perceived) has, on net, increased over time, elementary schoolage children, given their tender years, seem especially vulnerable to the
consequences of any decay in school safety or increase in school crime or
violence. Finally, to the extent that external dedicated funding exists for
SRO/police for any participating schools,177 we can also easily envision
elementary schools electing to take on (or enhance) an SRO/police presence
for the narrow purpose of gaining an “extra” set of adult hands to generally
assist at a school rather than to address any objective school safety, crime, or
security concerns.178
Given how the elementary and non-elementary school contexts differ,
we felt it prudent to look more closely at the elementary school context in
isolation. To this end, we re-ran our basic logistic regression models (Table
3) on the subset of elementary schools. Interestingly, and as our findings in
Table 7 make clear, what persists across all school levels is that increases in
student disorder rates as well as enrollment correspond with systemic
increases in the likelihood that an elementary school reported a student
incident to law enforcement agencies. The major change—and surprise—is
that in the elementary school setting, a school’s SRO/police presence does
not correlate with the school’s reporting rate. Another surprise is that for
elementary schools, a decrease in a school’s percentage of boys correlates
with an increase in the school’s rate of law enforcement referrals. Our
surprise flows from comparing this finding with numerous assertions in the
scholarly and popular literatures about how school discipline policies and
practices disproportionately disadvantage boys.179
175

See TRAVIS III & COON, supra note 95, at 85 (analyzing an array of reasons schools
include SROs).
176
See AARON KUPCHIK, THE REAL SCHOOL SAFETY PROBLEM: THE LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF HARSH SCHOOL PUNISHMENT 28 (2016) (explaining that “SRO programs
are very popular among parents, teachers, and school administrators” because “[t]hey offer a
sense of comfort and security, provide a first-responder already on campus in case of
emergency, and can advise school administrators on legal matters”); see also Monahan &
Torres, supra note 81, at 2–3.
177
See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.
178
See CURRAN, FISHER, VIANO & KUPCHIK, supra note 69, at 27–28 (noting an array of
reasons motivating schools’ decisions to include an SRO/police presence).
179
See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, What Men? The Essentialist Error of the ‘End of Men’, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–22 (2013); Jayanti Owens, Early Childhood Behavior Problems and
the Gender Gap in Educational Attainment in the United States, 89 SOC. EDUC. 236, 253–54
(2016); Camera, supra note 19. See generally CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST
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Table 7: Logistic Regression Models of Whether an Elementary School
Reported a Student Discipline Incident to a Law Enforcement Agency
SRO/police at sch. (1=yes)
Total SRO/police at school
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School Black %
School male %
School district mean per pupil spending
Constant
Pseudo R2
N (raw)

(1)
1.36

(0.29)

(2)
1.36
--1.00
1.00
1.21
1.32*
1.34
1.00*
1.03
0.62
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98*
1.00

(0.33)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.30)
(0.00)
(0.37)
(0.18)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

(3)
--1.12
1.00
1.00
1.20
1.31*
1.32
1.00*
1.03
0.61
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98*
1.00

0.37**
(0.05)
0.26
(0.23)
0.28
0.00
0.11
0.10
470
460
460
NOTES: Whether a school reported a student disciplinary incident to law enforcement
agencies (1=yes). Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses.
The models were estimated using the “logistic” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used
SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).

When we transition to more granular analyses of school referral rates
(Table 8), we find that for elementary schools, once again, nothing about the
magnitude of a school’s SRO/police presence statistically corresponds with
a school’s reporting rate. We also note that school enrollments influence
recedes from statistical significance. Increases in school disorder rates, by
contrast, continue to correlate with school referral rates in the expected
direction, though not for non-violent incidents. Finally, the counter-intuitive
(for us, anyway) finding that a decrease in an elementary school’s percentage

BOYS: HOW MISGUIDED FEMINISM IS HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN (2000) (arguing that schools
and their disciplinary policies and processes disadvantage boys more than girls).

(0.14)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.30)
(0.00)
(0.37)
(0.18)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.25)

768

HEISE & NANCE

[Vol. 111

of boys correlates with an increase in the school’s reporting rate for all
student disciplinary incidents persists.180
Table 8: Fractional Response Regression Models of Elementary School
Report Rates For All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law
Enforcement Agencies
All Incidents
Total SRO/police at school
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School Black %
School male %
School district mean per pupil spending

0.87
1.01
1.00
1.01
1.21**
1.24
1.00
0.38*
1.20
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.96**
1.00

(0.18)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.13)
(0.04)
(0.34)
(0.00)
(0.18)
(0.39)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

Non-violent
Incidents
1.16
1.02
1.00
1.12
1.09
1.58
1.00
0.84
0.59
1.01
1.01
1.00
0.99
1.00

(0.18)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.23)
(0.05)
(0.44)
(0.00)
(0.64)
(0.20)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)

Constant
0.06
(0.07)
0.00**
(0.00)
Pseudo R2
0.16
0.05
N (raw)
460
460
NOTES: The dependent variables include the rate of elementary school reports for all
student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies and the rate of elementary
school reports for only non-violent student incidents to law enforcement agencies.
Robust standard errors, clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were
estimated using the “fracreg logit” command in Stata (v.16.1) and used the odds ratio
option and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).

Finally, once we turn to our selection models—models that functionally
condition out elementary schools that experienced no recorded student
disciplinary incidents (and thus, by definition, had nothing to consider
reporting to law enforcement agencies)—material differences between the

180
Cf. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 156 (2017) (reporting that female juvenile arrests rates
“increased more or decreased less” than male juvenile arrests rates for simple and aggravated
assault during the “Get Tough Era” from 1980 to 2011).
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elementary and middle- and high school contexts emerge with even greater
clarity. Specifically, as the top panel of Table 9 makes clear, none of the
earlier findings persist. The consistent absence of any statistically significant
relation between an elementary school’s SRO/police presence and the
elementary schools’ law enforcement agency reporting practices, once
combined with our prior results from our entire sample of schools, implies
that the SRO/police influence in the middle and high school contexts is
particularly acute.
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Table 9: Selection Models of the Rate (per 100 students) of Elementary
School Reports of All and Non-Violent Student Discipline Incidents to Law
Enforcement Agencies and Total Recorded Student Discipline Incidents
All Incidents:
(1)
(s.e.)

Non-violent Incidents:
(2)
(s.e.)

-0.03
-0.01
0.01
-0.12
0.37
-0.07
-0.00
-0.81
-0.01
-0.01
0.01
-0.01
-0.04
-0.00
3.79*

0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.05
-0.00
-0.02
-0.05
0.00
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
0.00
0.12

Rate of school police reports (per 100 students)
Total SRO/police at school
School student:teacher ratio
School student mobility % (in/out)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
School student enrollment
Violent. incident report req. (1=yes)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
School poverty %
School nonwhite %
School. Black %
School male %
School district mean per pupil spending
Constant
Any student incident at school? (1=yes)

(0.10)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.09)
(0.21)
(0.17)
(0.00)
(0.49)
(0.13)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(1.77)

(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.10)
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.17)

SRO/police at sch.(1=yes)
0.10
(0.20)
0.06
(0.20)
School student:teacher ratio
0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
School student mobility % (in/out)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
School urban. scale (rural-to-urban)
0.02
(0.11)
0.02
(0.11)
School disorder report rate (per 100)
56.23**
(8.31)
55.93**
(5.00)
School area crime scale (lo-to-hi)
0.48*
(0.24)
0.52*
(0.24)
School student enrollment
0.00*
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
Violent incident report req. (1=yes)
0.56
(0.53)
0.61
(0.52)
Non-violent incident report req. (1=yes)
-0.22
(0.25)
-0.18
(0.26)
School poverty %
0.01
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
School nonwhite %
-0.01
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.00)
School Black %
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
School male %
0.00
(0.01)
-0.00
(0.01)
School district mean per pupil spending
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
Constant
-2.06*
(0.91)
-1.80*
(0.88)
Rho
0.30
(0.32)
-0.11
(0.26)
N (raw)
460
460
NOTES: Model 1 explores all student disciplinary incidents; model 2 only non-violent
incidents. For both models, the first-stage models whether a school experienced any
recorded student disciplinary incidents. The second-stage models the rate (per 100
students) of school reports of all and non-violent student incidents to law
enforcement agencies in models 1 and 2, respectively. Robust standard errors,
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clustered on school district, in parentheses. The models were estimated using the
“heckman” command in Stata (v.16.1) and SSOCS weighted data. * p<0.05; **
p<0.01.
SOURCES: U.S. Dept. Educ., Nat’l Ctr. Educ. Statistics, 2015–2016 School Survey
on Crime and Safety (SSOCS); U.S. Dept. Comm., Census Bureau, 2016 Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance File (2016).

CONCLUSION
When we submit two persistent and key school-to-prison pipeline
claims to more recent SSOCS data and more granular empirical testing, what
emerges, on balance, is persistent support for one claim and a notable deficit
of direct support for the other. When it comes to either whether a school
reports any student disciplinary incidents to law enforcement agencies or a
school’s rate of reporting, we find consistent and robust evidence—and
across virtually all of our models—that a school’s SRO/police presence
exerts upward influence on schools’ inclination to report and rate of
reporting. While we did not undertake a precise or literal “replication” of
prior studies, our core findings on these points generally comport with prior
research on earlier SSOCS data sets.181
A second core school-to-prison pipeline hypothesis dwells on
distributional claims. Specifically, many critics of an increasingly
“legalized” approach to student discipline in schools argue that increases in
school reporting, flowing from increases in schools’ SRO/police presence,
disproportionately involve students of color, boys, students from low-income
households, and other vulnerable student sub-groups. As we noted
previously, direct evidence on this specific claim from the SSOCS data set is
simply not possible owing to the absence of any individual-level
demographic data (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status) on the
students whose conduct triggered a possible school referral to law
enforcement agencies.
Despite the absence of more helpful student-level demographic data,
our school-level findings do not hint at any obvious distributional concerns.
Virtually all of the (few) instances where any of the traditional
“distributional-concerning” variables achieved statistical significance
involve gender.182 And, somewhat surprisingly, our results imply that a
181
For a brief discussion on replication studies see Michael Heise, Beyond Replication: A
Few Comments on Spruk and Kovac and Martin-Quinn Scores, 61 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 1,
1 (2020); William H.J. Hubbard, A Replication Study Worth Replicating: A Comment on
Salmanowitz and Spamann, 58 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2019).
182
Only in one of our models (tbl.3, model 2) did we observe that an increase in the
percentage of a school’s students in poverty corresponds with an increase in the school’s
reporting rate of non-violent incidents.
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decrease in a school’s percentage of male students corresponds with an
increase in school reporting rates. While our distributional-related findings
generally comport with past empirical research using earlier SSOCS data
sets, our findings remain somewhat at odds with received popular wisdom.183
Because elementary schools strike us as sufficiently different than
middle and high schools, especially when it comes to school safety and
student discipline matters, we explored the elementary school context
further. What we find is that our initial results underscoring the influence of
an SRO/police presence on schools’ likelihood of referring student incidents
to law enforcement agencies recede when we limit our analyses to elementary
schools. What may help account for this particular finding includes a
comparatively lower base rate of recorded student disciplinary incidents
(their lower frequency and, we presume, lesser severity) in elementary
schools.
Going forward, future research on these and other, related school-toprison pipeline claims would benefit from improved individual-level data,
especially as it relates to the individual students whose conduct triggered a
possible school referral to law enforcement agencies. Another current data
deficit relates to information on the criminal justice outcomes for those
students whose conduct triggered a school referral to law enforcement
agencies. While it is certainly plausible to assert that any adverse interaction
between a student and a law enforcement agency is, on balance, negative,
more granular data on the formal legal dispositions of these interactions
would provide helpful information for a broader sweep of related research
questions.
We close by emphasizing the complexity of this issue, the increasingly
charged area of student discipline, and the growing demands from parents,
students, and school administrators for greater school security and order. The
nuanced, complex, and varied interactions with a school’s SRO/police
presence, and whether such a presence’s net costs exceed its benefits, is not
obvious and likely varies across school districts and, perhaps, schools. While
such decisions will inevitably involve some degree of political calculation,
surrendering these decisions to an unusually politicized environment—and
with total disregard for available data—invites self-defeat. Indeed, it is
precisely moments like these, where political emotions appear especially raw
and enflamed, when a good-faith commitment to “following data” is at a
premium.184
183

See, e.g., George, supra note 11, at 494 (“[C]hildren of color and low-income
children . . . are disproportionately targeted for referral and arrest by police in schools.”).
184
For a similar admonition see Michael Heise, Following Data and a Giant:
Remembering Ted Eisenberg, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 9 (2014).

